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Abstract
Context: System safety refers to a diverse engineering discipline assessing and improving various aspects of safety in socio-technical
systems and their software-intensive sub-systems. While system safety has been a vital area of applied research for many decades,
its practice and practitioners seem empirically still not well studied. Beyond anecdotal evidence—case reports, interviews, discussion
forums, blogs, and “war stories” serving as interesting examples in textbooks—and surveys, we are missing open, large-scale, and long-
term empirical investigations that promote knowledge transfer and research validation. Objective: In this article, we explore means
for work that safety practitioners rely on, factors influencing the performance of these professionals, and their perception of their role
in the system life cycle. Along with that we want to examine observations from previous research. Methods: We build a construct
of safety practice, collect data for this construct using an on-line survey, summarise and interpret the collected data, and investigate
several hypotheses based on the previous observations. Results: We analyse and present the responses of 124 practitioners in safety-
critical system and software projects. Aside from other findings, our data • suggests that safety decision making mainly depends on
expert opinion and project memory, • lacks evidence that safety is typically a cost-benefit question, • does not exhibit the prejudice
that formal methods are not beneficial, • leaves it unclear as to whether or not standards and methods have become inadequate,
and • indicates that safety is not typically confused with reliability. Additionally, we contribute a research design directing towards
explanatory empirical studies of safety practice. Conclusions: We believe that empirical research of safety practice is still in an early
stage, bearing the risk of undesirable mismatches of the state of the art and the state of practice. However, this situation offers great
opportunities for research.
Keywords: Safety-critical system, safety practitioner, professional profile and situation, state of the practice, on-line
survey, exploratory study
1. Introduction
System safety practice (safety practice for short) is a
remarkably diverse field spanning many disciplines in-
volved in the system life cycle, influenced by heteroge-
neous criticality-driven safety cultures [1, 2, 3] across var-
ious application domains, geographical regions, and regu-
latory authorities.
Researchers have surveyed and investigated practised
approaches to accident prevention, for example, in the
chemical plant and nuclear power plant sectors [2] and
in the construction industries [3]. However, our literature
search has not uncovered a single officially published em-
pirical investigation (i.e., a case or field study, a controlled
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field experiment, a survey of practitioners) of the effective-
ness of practised approaches to prevent or reduce software
and (control) systems’ contributions to hazards.
In the following, we highlight the motivations for our
study, describe observations from previous research, out-
line our research objective, and summarise the contribu-
tions of this work.
1.1. Problem Statement
From exploratory content analysis of more than 200 se-
lected question and answer posts on several safety practi-
tioners’ (SP) on-line channels of a period of 4 years and
one expert interview [4], we observe that SPs
1. discuss various issues with the application of stan-
dards, calculation of failure rates, correct planning of
safety tests, and completeness of hazard analyses;
2. are missing a standardised way of integrating safety
with security activities;
3. are concerned about the adequacy of methods, a
lack of safety education, and the misunderstanding
of their role.
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From exploratory content analysis of more than 370 case
reports (i.e., on incidents and accidents) from the aviation,
automotive, and railway domains and 7 semi-structured in-
terviews with SPs from these domains [5], we observe that
1. human errors and specification errors were more of-
ten reported as accident root causes than software im-
plementation errors—this is consistent with the find-
ings in [6, p. 30f];
2. no IT security problems were reported;
3. reports in general, and comparably often in the au-
tomotive domain, were non-informative of subtle ac-
cident root causes (i.e., causes lying outside the pos-
sibilities, budgets, or obligations of accident analysts
and investigators);
4. few of the selected reports at least suggest that
accidental complexity [7]—particularly, missing or
mistaken maintenance, refactoring, evolution, or
migration—negatively affects system safety;
5. interviewees report issues of unclear separation of
system-level and software-level activities (cf. [8]);
6. interviewees state that available methods are cur-
rently just appropriate in their domains but can easily
get insufficient for complex future applications.
These observations fuel some almost negligently ac-
cepted computer-related risks—as regularly archived
by Neumann et al. [9]—as well as occasional but recent
worries about the state of the practice and education in
safety engineering in particular [10] and in software engi-
neering (SE) in general [11].
1.2. Research Objectives
These findings certainly ask for more evidence. In line
with the research agenda in [12], safety engineering re-
search might, hence, pose clarifying questions such as:
1. Which means are SPs familiar with and which do they
currently use? How clear, unambiguous, consistent,
up-to-date, and effective are those means?
2. What are the SPs’ current problems, challenges,
needs, and expectations?
3. How do SPs view their profession, role, and contribu-
tion in the life cycle?
1.3. Contributions
This work contributes to safety research in several ways:
• First, we present results of a cross-sectional self-
administered on-line survey among SPs: Particularly,
we sample some of their experiences, views, opinions,
and their self-perception.
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Figure 1: Overview of the research method for this article
• Then, we test several comparative hypotheses (Sec-
tion 4.4) on safety practice and SPs and interpret our
test results (Section 5.1) with respect to findings and
experience from previous work [5, 4]. This way, we
also elaborate on results in [13].
• Furthermore, we respond to the request from Alexan-
der et al. [14] and Rae et al. [15] for applying im-
proved methodology in empirical research of safety
practice, as well as the desire of a stronger involve-
ment of SPs in research evaluation such as stated by
Martins and Gorschek [12].
• Moreover, we contribute a research design (Section 3)
for similar empirical assessments. This setting might
as well be applicable to other SE domains (see, e.g.
[16]).
1.4. Overview
Figure 1 provides an overview of the research proce-
dures for this article. After discussing terminology and
related work in Section 2 and describing our research
method in Section 3, we present our results in Section 4.
Particularly, we describe our sample in Section 4.2 and
summarise the results of all valid responses in Section 4.3.
Section 4.4 highlights the results of several hypotheses
tests. Our discussion follows in Section 5, with the inter-
pretation of our test results in Section 5.1 and the exami-
nation of threats to the validity of our study in Section 5.4.
We summarise our findings in Section 6. Appendix A con-
tains a detailed summary of the response data.
2
2. Background
We introduce important terms as well as related work
we will revisit in our discussions below.
2.1. Terminology and Definitions
The life cycle of an engineered system typically refers to
the phases of design, implementation, release, mainte-
nance, operation, and disposal. Dependability then encom-
passes the handling of reliability, availability, maintainabil-
ity, and safety in the life cycle, for example, by improving
fault-tolerance.
In this work, we focus the discipline of system safety,1
including functional safety. System safety is usually situ-
ated in the context of safety of machinery,2 process safety,3
structural safety,4 or occupational health and safety. These
disciplines have in common the identification, assessment,
and management of operational risk. This procedure in-
cludes the prevention or handling of undesired events at
any stage (e.g. hazards or safety risks, incidents, and acci-
dents) and of any type (e.g. human error, software faults,
and system failures). In addition, security of informa-
tion technology (IT security or security for short) is the
discipline of protecting computer-based systems and data
against malicious attacks and unauthorised access.
Then, safety practice denotes the practical aspects of sys-
tem safety in both industrial settings and applied research.
Based on this, we consider a safety practitioner as a person
who supports or performs safety decision making, particu-
larly, by identifying hazards and assessing their causes and
consequences, the design of hazard countermeasures (also
known as hazard controls), the assurance of safety, or by
performing research and consultancy for these safety ac-
tivities. Importantly, there are many means—that is, best
practices, methods, techniques, and standards—to apply
in these activities.
2.2. Related Work
As indicated in Section 1, there are only few cross-
disciplinary exploratory inquiries of safety practice and
its practitioners. The following studies demonstrate the
importance of empirical methods (interviews and related
survey methods such as focus groups and questionnaires)
in further examining safety practice.
Dwyer [17], for multiple disciplines, and Knight [8],
for software engineering, characterise safety practice from
their experience, forecasting the ongoing trend of in-
creased automation, the increasingly critical interplay be-
tween the involved engineering domains, and the corre-
sponding challenges for future safety research.
1From software, electrical, electronics, control, and systems engineer-
ing.
2From mechanical engineering.
3From automation and plant engineering.
4From construction or civil engineering.
Adequacy of Means of Work in Safety Practice. Safety-
critical systems are subjected to automation (i.e., the use
of qualified and verified tool chains) for their develop-
ment, testing, and overall assurance. Graaf et al. [18]
and Kasurinen et al. [19] investigate challenges and ob-
stacles to adoption of new methods, languages, and tools
in embedded system RE, architecture design, and software
testing. Our study explores this direction within safety
practice.
Hatcliff et al. [20] summarise particular challenges in
the certification of software-dependent systems and sug-
gest improvements, stressing the concept of “designed-in
safety/security.” These works inspired and underpin our
hypotheses but are different from our survey approach to
examining safety practice and its practitioners.
Chen et al. [21] report on the challenges and best prac-
tices of using assurance cases. Our questionnaire about
safety practice includes more general questions about
methods, training, and interaction, backed by a larger
number of data points.
For organisations that engineer safety-critical systems,
Ceccarelli and Silva [22] provide a framework for com-
pliance checking during and after the introduction of new
safety standards (e.g. DO-178B) into an organisation. In
our study, we are asking SPs whether safety standards
known and used by our respondents, actually improve the
organisation’s safety practice.
McDermid and Rae [10] report on their cross-domain
insights into the practice of engineering safety-critical sys-
tems, discussing the question: “How did systems get so
safe despite inadequate and inadequately applied tech-
niques?” Without presuming that modern systems are
acceptably safe, we interrogate SPs about their means of
work.
Wang and Wagner [23] investigate decision processes in
safety activities. For complex and highly critical systems
such processes are usually committee- or group-driven to
reduce organisational single points of failure. The authors
examine whether such decision making is prone to a num-
ber of pitfalls known as “groupthink” and studied in group
psychology. Being more exploratory in nature, our study
design differs from the psychology-based construct used
in [23] and yet addresses a fraction of it.
Process Factors influencing Safety Practice. Requirements
engineering (RE) and, particularly, requirements specifi-
cation, are critical points of failure in every safety-critical
system project. Examining research on the communica-
tion and validation of safety requirements in industrial
projects, Martins and Gorschek [12] conclude that there
is a lack of evidence for the usefulness and usability of
recent safety research. We want to contrast their finding
with how practitioners currently perceive the adequacy of
their means of work.
Nair et al. [24] present results from a survey of 52 SPs
on how they manage the variety of safety evidence for criti-
cal computer-based systems. Good evidence management
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implies many technical challenges in safety practice. Par-
ticularly, traceability is crucial for change impact analy-
sis (CIA), that is, the analysis of how changes of safety-
critical artefacts (e.g. specifications, issue databases, de-
signs) are propagated and whether these changes have
negative safety impact. Borg et al. [25] report on 14 inter-
views with SPs about their CIA activities, finding that SPs
have difficulties in understanding the motivation of CIA,
are overwhelmed by the information they have to process
when conducting CIA, and struggle with trusting and up-
dating former CIAs. From a cross-sectional survey of 97
practitioners, De la Vara et al. [26] observe insufficient
CIA tool support. Our study examines such means of work
from a more general viewpoint.
In the Sections 3.3.1 and 3.4.1, we establish relations
between these works and our study. In Table 8 in Sec-
tion 5.2, we compare their findings with our results.
3. Survey Planning
This section describes our survey design (Section 3.1),
the survey instrument (Section 3.3), our working hypothe-
ses (Section 3.4), the procedure for data collection (Sec-
tion 3.5) and analysis (Section 3.6), and instrument eval-
uation (Section 3.7). We follow the guidelines in [27] for
planning and conducting our survey and [28, 29, 30] for
the reporting.
3.1. Research Goal and Questions
From our project experience summarised in Section 1.1
and previous research [13, 5, 4], we have learned about
typical issues in safety practice. This cross-sectional survey
design aims at resuming these issues. The objective of this
exploratory study is
to investigate safety practice and its practitioners
and to examine observations we made during our
preliminary research.
For this, we explore three research questions:
RQ1 Which means do SPs typically rely on in their activi-
ties? How helpful are those means to them?
RQ2 Which typical process factors have influence on SPs’
decisions and performance?
RQ3 How do SPs perceive and understand their role in
the process or life cycle?
3.1.1. Construct
For this objective and these research questions, we in-
troduce the construct safety practice and its practition-
ers (SPP). This construct incorporates SPs’ processes, tasks,
roles, methods, tools, and infrastructures and, by interro-
gating them via a questionnaire, their views and opinions
of safety practice. SPP is divided into three sub-constructs:
Classification of SPs, Constituents of safety practice, and
Table 1: Classification criteria for characterising the population and
for sample assessment. Legend: MC. . . multiple-choice, (N)ominal or
(O)rdinal scale
Classification Criterion Scale
Educational Background N / MC
Application Domains N / MC
Level of Experience O / duration in years
Familiarity with Standards N / MC
Familiarity with Methods N / MC
Geographical Regions Open / MC
Native Languages N / MC
Working Languages N / MC
Safety-related Roles N / MC
Table 2: Constituents of safety practice and practitioner’s expectations
and challenges. Legend: (N)ominal or (O)rdinal scale, (T)ruth values
as nominal scale, * . . . half-open or open.
Construct Scales
Constituents of Safety Practice
Safety Process (activities, roles,
and practitioners)
N / e.g. decisions, hazard
identification, resources
Factors (constraints and issues) T / e.g. lack of resources, high
schedule pressure
Means (conventional
techniques; formal methods;
tools; norms; skills; knowledge
sources)
N* / e.g. FMEA, ISO26262,
FMEA expertise, expert opinions
Application domains (current,
new, complex)
N* / e.g. systems based on
adaptive control, machine
learning
Expectations & Challenges in Safety Practice (as perceived by SPs)
Performance of safety activities O / high . . . low performance
Adequacy of means O / high . . . low adequacy
Collaboration between safety
and security engineers
O / effective . . . ineffective
collaboration
Value of knowledge sources to
SPs
O / high . . . low, per class of
methods or standards
Adaptation and improvement of
SPs’ skills
O / high . . . low
self-improvement/adaptation
Notion, perception, and priority
of safety activities
N*
Contribution of SPs to system
life cycle
O / high . . . low contribution
Expectations & challenges in safety practice. The construct
is visualised in Figure 2.
The criteria for classification in Table 1 and the break-
down in Table 2 are results from the first author’s expe-
rience from research in system safety, from collaborations
with industry, from expert interview transcripts, and from
the supervision of the three thesis projects documented
in [13, 5, 4]. The bottom-up creation of the SPP construct
took place along the lines of grounded theory [31] based
on these materials and further experience gained during
the survey execution.
Below, we use the following prefixes when referenc-
ing important content items: RQ for research questions,
h for working hypotheses, q for questions in the question-
naire, and F for findings. References will have the shape
〈X〉〈Label〉[−〈o〉] where X ∈ {RQ, h, q, F} and o can refer
4
qAp
pO
fMe
th
qPo
sIm
pO
fFM
s
Con
trib
utio
n to
Life
Cyc
le
hH
iPr
ioH
iSa
f
hIn
suf
Std
s
hPo
sSe
lfIm
g
hLo
Col
lLo
Saf
Val
ue
of
Sou
rce
s
qCo
Wo
rke
rs
qEf
fNo
tion
On
Job
qVa
lue
OfK
now
qU
nde
sire
dEv
Means of Work in
Safety Practice (RQ1)
Col
lab
ora
tion
qIm
pO
fEc
o
hFM
sIm
prS
af
hSa
fIsC
ost
qIm
prO
fSk
ills
hIn
suf
Me
th
hEx
p:D
ivG
TSi
ng
hSa
fIsV
alu
ed
hSa
fIsR
el
qEf
fRo
leO
nJo
b
Process
Factors
(RQ2)
Safety Process
(RQ3)
qIn
tOf
Saf
Sec
Per
for
ma
nce
Ad
apt
atio
n o
f
Ski
lls
hSa
fBy
Sec
No
tion
of
Saf
ety
hEx
pD
eci
des
qIm
pO
fEx
p
hLo
Res
LoS
af
hSP
sAd
ptS
kls
qIm
pO
fCo
nst
r
Ad
equ
acy
of
Me
ans
qPr
ioO
fSa
fety
qVa
lOf
Con
trib
Safety-critical
Applications (SPP)
qAd
eqO
fMt
hSt
d
qN
otio
nO
fSa
fety
Figure 2: Research design for our main construct “safety practice and its practitioners” (SPP, Section 3.1.1). The base (h)ypotheses layer is backed by
data of the (q)uestionnaire layer (dashed edges). The latter layer contains questions providing data about (solid edges) expectations and challenges
(boxes in grey). These expectations and challenges are formulated over (dotted edges) the Constituents of safety practice (framed boxes). For sake of
brevity, classification criteria (Table 1) are omitted.
to an answer option in the questionnaire. Additionally, we
provide legends along with the corresponding figures.
3.2. Survey Participants and Population
Safety practitioners are our direct study subjects, our
target group. A safety practitioner is a person whose pro-
fessional activities as a practitioner or researcher in indus-
try or academia are tightly related to the engineering of
safety-critical systems. Table 1 lists criteria we use to char-
acterise and identify members of the population of SPs.
Safety practice, as described in Section 2.1, is our indirect
study object. SPs participating in our study are also called
study or survey participants or respondents.
3.3. Data Collection Instrument: On-line Questionnaire
Table 4 provides details on the (q)uestions we discuss
in this work. For sake of conciseness, concept traceability,
and compact presentation in this article, we consolidated
the questions stated in our questionnaire, of course taking
care of maintaining their original meanings. For verifica-
tion of this transformation, the whole original question-
naire and its code book are documented in [13].
3.3.1. Motivations underlying the Questions
In the following, we establish links between the ques-
tions and other research summarised in Section 2.2.
qAdeqOfMthStd. Bloomfield and Bishop [32] contrast pre-
scriptive regulation with goal-based regulation, review-
ing current practice, highlighting potential benefits of
safety cases along with the challenge of gaining suffi-
cient confidence. Starting from a general position, ques-
tion qAdeqOfMthStd is about norms adequacy in general.
Table 3: Scales used in the questionnaire
Type Values
value very high (vh), (h)igh, (m)edium, (l)ow, very low (vl)
agreement strongly agree (sa), (a)gree, neither agree nor disagree
(nand), (d)isagree, strongly disagree (sd)
impact (h)igh, (m)edium, (l)ow, (n)o impact
adequacy very adequate (va), (a)dequate, slightly adequate (sa),
not adequate (na)
frequency often, rarely/occasionally, never; or all, many, few,
none
choice single/multiple: (ch)ecked, (un)checked; or yes, no
For maturity measurement, Ceccarelli and Silva [22]
work with a construct similar to the one in Table 2. By
asking question qAdeqOfMthStd, we cover practitioners’
views (and opinions) independent of a specific norm.
The questions about adequacy of means (particularly,
qAdeqOfMthStd, qAppOfMeth, qPosImpOfFMs), aim at
the re-examination of known challenges as, for example,
discussed by Kasurinen et al. [19] and Graaf et al. [18].
The answer categories for question qAdeqOfMthStd are
based on industry sectors with a relatively high pace
of innovation and/or new, complex, but not yet well-
understood system applications (e.g. self-driving cars).
qValueOfKnow. Lethbridge et al. [33] observe that test
and quality documentation is the most likely maintained
kind of documentation. With question qValueOfKnow, we
want to find out about how project documentation is used
in safety decision making.
Moreover, Rae and Alexander [34] examine how confi-
dence in safety expert judgements (e.g. individual versus
group judgements) is justified and leads to actual valid-
ity of the conclusions the further stages of the safety life
5
Table 4: Transcription and summary of selected questions from the questionnaire. Legend: Nominal, (O)rdinal, (L)IKERT-type scale, (T)ruth values
as nominal scale, MC. . . multiple-choice, * . . . half-open or open. Figures 12 to 23 show details on the options; Sec./Fig. serves the navigation.
Question Scale (see Table 3) Sec. Fig. N
qValueOfKnow: Of how much value are specific knowledge sources for safety decision
making?
L* / value per source 4.3.1 12 97
qImpOfConstr: To which extent do specific process constraints and issues negatively
impact safety activities?
O* / impact per factor 4.3.2 13 93
qImpOfEco: How often do economic factors have a strong influence on the handling of
hazards?
O / frequency 4.3.3 – 93
qAdeqOfMthStd: Regarding a specific application domain, how adequate are applicable
safety standards and methods in ensuring safety?
O / adequacy per domain 4.3.4 14 102
qAppOfMeth: The application of conventional techniques (e.g. FMEA and FTA) has
become too difficult for complex applications of recent technologies.
L / agreement 4.3.5 15 97
qPosImpOfFMs: Estimate the positive impact of formal methods on safety activities and
system safety.
O / impact 4.3.6 16 58
qImprOfSkills: Specify your level of agreement with 4 statements about factors improving
a SP’s skills.
L / agreement per statement 4.3.7 17 96
qIntOfSafSec: Specify your level of agreement with 10 statements about the interaction
of safety and security activities.
L / agreement per statement 4.3.8 18 95
qNotionOfSafety: How is safety viewed in your field of practice? Nominal* / MC 4.3.9 19 95
qPrioOfSafety: Specify your level of agreement with 4 statements about factors increasing
the efficiency in safety activities.
L / agreement per statement 4.3.10 20 97
qEffRoleOnJob: Is your job affected by any predominant definition of your role? In either
case, we request for comment.
T* / comment 4.3.11 – 91
qEffNotionOnJob: Is your job affected by any predominant view of safety? In either case,
we request for comment.
T* / comment 4.3.12 – 95
qUndesiredEv: Specify your level of agreement with 5 statements about safety activities. L / agreement per statement 4.3.13 21 97
qValOfContrib: Of how much value is your role as a practitioner or researcher in
safety-critical system developments?
L / value 4.3.14 22a 95
qCoWorkers: How much value do non-safety co-workers attribute to the role of a safety
practitioner?
L / value 4.3.15 22b 95
qImpOfExp: Specify your level of agreement with 2 statements about the role of
experience in safety activities.
L / agreement per statement 4.3.16 23 96
cycle are based on. The authors argue that expert risk as-
sessments exhibit low effectiveness in measuring risk as
an objective quantity and propose “risk assessment as a
means of describing, rather than quantifying risk.” Their
analysis extends the background of qValueOfKnow.
qIntOfSafSec and qPrioOfSafety. While Chen et al. [21] fo-
cus on the aspect of training and collaboration in safety as-
surance, our study crosses these aspects generally with the
questions qIntOfSafSec and qPrioOfSafety about interac-
tion in and efficiency of safety activities.
The questions qIntOfSafSec, qValOfContrib, and
qCoWorkers address the integration of safety activities
with the life cycle, similar to Bjarnason et al. [35] on the
alignment of RE and verification and validation.
In contrast to tool support for optimal auditing as
investigated by Dodd and Habli [36], our questions
(i.e., qEffRoleOnJob, qValOfContrib, qCoWorkers, and
qImpOfExp) help to solicit personal views of SPs as ex-
ternal auditors and consultants.
qImpOfConstr, qImpOfEco, and qNotionOfSafety. As sum-
marised in Section 1.1 and as discussed in [5], we
presume negative consequences of “accidental complex-
ity” [7] on system safety. Lim et al. [37] examine the
perception of technical debt, highlighting the inevitable
trade-off between software quality and business value. In
an unfortunate case, an acceptance of technical debt can
lead to an acceptance of low software quality, and for
some systems, to an acceptance of accidental complex-
ity. Whenever this reasoning applies to a safety-critical
system, we should ask whether this system is taken in
by an unacceptable trade-off between safety and business
value? Asking the questions qImpOfConstr, qImpOfEco,
and qNotionOfSafety, we inversely probe the demand for
investigations of the safety impact of technical debt.
Based on the SPP construct, we interrogate SPs about
supportive factors (qValueOfKnow, qPrioOfSafety) and
obstacles (qImpOfConstr) in safety decision making, gath-
ered from our previous interviews in [5, 4].
3.3.2. Notes on the Questionnaire
Some questions in Table 4 are half-open, that is, we
allow respondents to extend the list of given answer op-
tions. The scales used for encoding the answers in the
column “Scale” are described in Table 3. We treat value
and agreement as a 5-level LIKERT-type scale. Value, im-
pact, adequacy, and frequency scales are equipped with a
“do not know (dnk)” option. Together with “neither agree
nor disagree (nand)” answers, participants are given two
ways to stay indecisive. This way, we try to reduce bias
by forced responses. From comparative analysis, we con-
clude that it is safe to discard dnk-answers and missing
answers from our analyses.
We expect survey participants to spend 20–30 minutes
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on the questionnaire. Although we do not collect personal
data, they can leave us their email address if they want to
receive our results.
3.4. Working Hypotheses
We derive working hypotheses from our observa-
tions (Section 1.1) from previous research [5, 4, 13]. Ta-
ble 5 contains two types of working (h)ypotheses we want
to analyse and test with the data we collect from the sur-
vey participants. First, the base hypotheses incorporate
observations, assumptions, or prejudices, either identified
from our previous research or already made by other re-
searchers. Additionally, we elaborate comparative hypothe-
ses during exploratory analysis [38] of the responses.
Some hypotheses in Table 5 are directly measured by
a single compound question (see, e.g. hExp:DivGTSing
and qImpOfExp). We do not collect data for each indi-
vidual construct referred to in such hypothesis-question
pairs.
Figure 2 summarises the survey design presented in Sec-
tions 3.1 to 3.4 by showing important interrelationships
between the base hypotheses, the questions of the ques-
tionnaire, and the parts of the SPP construct.
3.4.1. Motivations underlying the Hypotheses
In the following, we justify our working hypotheses
through establishing links to other research (Section 2.2).
hExpDecides: SPs’ activities mainly depend on expert opin-
ion and experience from similar projects. It is well-known
that experts are fallible (see, e.g. recent investigations in
[39, 34, 23]) and, thus, relying on experts in organisa-
tional (and engineering) decision making can contribute
to critical single points of failures in such organisations.
Moreover, it is well-known that reusing (e.g. cloning)
repositories from finished projects in similar new projects
bears many risks of errors in reuse or update of these data.
Our previous interviews suggest that both these knowl-
edge sources are used in safety practice.
hLoResLoSaf: A lack of resources has a negative impact on
the performance of safety activities. The observations in
Section 1.1 motivate the collection of evidence on whether
or not a lack of resources might have a negative impact
on safety activities. For this hypothesis, “negative impact”
refers to, for example, deferred safety decisions, hindered
hazard identification and implementation of hazard con-
trols, or limited SPs’ abilities to fill their role. The con-
jecture that budgets constrain safety activities is further in-
spired by “the willingness to accept some technical risks
to achieve business goals” as concluded by Lim et al. [37,
p. 26].
hInsufStds: Safety activities for highly-automated applica-
tions lack support of appropriate standards and methods.
The belief that safety practice is missing adequate stan-
dards and methods has been discussed by Cant [40] and
Knauss [41]. Questions about the appropriateness of meth-
ods and standards have also been raised by McDermid and
Rae [10]. The idea behind hInsufStds is to understand the
situation of SPs in new, not yet matured industry sectors.
SPs would have the opportunity to adapt their skills and
to gain further expertise (hSPsAdptSkls).
hSPsAdptSkls: SPs improve their skills towards new appli-
cations, e.g. by studying recent results in safety research.
Hatcliff et al. [20] observe that “industry’s capability to
verify and validate these systems has not kept up” (we in-
quire willingness to improve skills with hSPsAdptSkls) and
that “the gap between practice and capability is increas-
ing” because of more integrated and more complex software
technologies. In contrast to the compliance framework pre-
sented by Ceccarelli and Silva [22], Hatcliff et al. high-
light that showing compliance with existing norms cannot
guarantee safety. Our study touches norms adequacy with
hInsufStds.
hInsufMeth: Conventional methods (e.g. FMEA, FTA) are
challenging to apply to complex modern applications. The
observation that conventional methods have become inade-
quate is broached by Knight [8, 42]. Likewise, McDermid
and Rae [10] and Hatcliff et al. [20] underpin hInsufStds
and hInsufMeth, though not the long-standing [43] and
frequent expectation that formal methods (FM) have a pos-
itive impact on safety practice (hFMsImprSaf).
hFMsImprSaf: The use of formal methods has a positive
impact on the performance of safety activities. The effi-
cacy of FMs in practice has been an only moderately re-
searched subject for many years, investigated, for exam-
ple, by Barroca and McDermid [44] and Woodcock et
al. [45]. One intention underlying hFMsImprSaf is to de-
termine whether we have to further examine FM effective-
ness to cross-validate reported experiences (e.g. [46]).
hSafBySec: For current applications, the assurance of safety
also depends strongly on the assurance of security. Safety-
critical applications of networked or connected (software)
systems have recently revived the question of how safety
and IT security influence each other? Along these lines, the
justification of hSafBySec is based on manifold anecdotal
evidence (see, e.g. [47]) that security problems can cause
safety violations and, possibly, vice versa.
hSafIsCost: Safety is more seen as a cost-increasing rather
than a cost-saving part in many application domains. How
are the practical achievements and implications of system
safety and the effort spent therefor related? How relevant
are such utilitarian and controversial questions to SPs and
their organisations? Touching this subject, hSafIsCost is
formulated in the context of “total cost of safety,” that is,
the cost of accident prevention and accident consequences
borne by organisations that engineer and operate safety-
critical systems. hSafIsCost’s truth might contribute nega-
tively to the role of SPs in an (engineering) organisation.
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Table 5: Overview of hypotheses (used as H1 in the tests). Legend: See Section 3.3. The quantification ranges a–j refer to the answer options of the
questions associated with the hypotheses, see Figures 12 to 23. The original questionnaire is documented in more detail in [13].
Hypothesis Supported if . . . (AC, Section 3.6.2)
Base Hypotheses
hExpDecides: SPs’ activities mainly depend on (d) expert opinion and
(g) experience from similar projects.
∀o ∈ {d, g}:med(qValueOfKnowo) ∈ {h, vh} ∧ o among 3 highest
valued (of 7) knowledge sources ∧ med(qImpOfExpa) ∈ {a, sa}
hLoResLoSaf: There is a lack of resources that has a negative impact on
the performance of safety activities.
∀o ∈ {a, d}:med(qImpOfConstro) ∈ {m, h} ∧med(qImpOfEco) ∈
{often} ∧ qNotionOfSafetyc ≤ 30
hInsufStds: Safety activities for highly-automated applications lack
support of appropriate standards and methods.
For ≥ 5 out of 7 domains o: med(qAdeqOfMthStdo) ∈ {sa,na}
hInsufMeth: Conventional methods (e.g. FMEA, FTA) are challenging
to apply to complex modern applications.
med(qAppOfMeth) ∈ {a, sa} ∧ qPosImpOfFMsm+h > 25%
hFMsImprSaf: The use of formal methods has a positive impact on the
performance of safety activities.
med(qPosImpOfFMs) ∈ {m, h}
hSPsAdptSkls: SPs improve their skills towards new applications, e.g.
by studying recent results in safety research.
∀o ∈ {a, b}:med(qImprOfSkillso) ∈ {a, sa}
hSafBySec: For current applications, the assurance of safety also
depends strongly on the assurance of security.
∀o ∈ {a, c, e, f}:med(qIntOfSafSeco) ∈ {a, sa}
hSafIsCost: Safety is more seen as a cost-increasing rather than a
cost-saving part in many application domains.
qNotionOfSafetyach > 60% ∧ ∀o ∈ {b, e}: qNotionOfSafetyoch < 40%
hLoCollLoSaf: A lack of collaboration of safety and security engineers
has a negative impact on safety activities.
∀o ∈ {h, i, j}:med(qIntOfSafSeco) ∈ {a, sa}
hHiPrioHiSaf: Prioritisation of safety in management decisions
enables SPs to perform their tasks more efficiently.
∀o ∈ {a, b}:med(qPrioOfSafetyo) ∈ {a, sa}
hSafIsRel: SPs understand safety as a special case of reliability. ∀o ∈ {a, e}:med(qUndesiredEvo) ∈ {a, sa} ∧ ∀o ∈
{b, c}:med(qUndesiredEvo) ∈ {d , sd}
hSafIsValued: SPs believe that their non-safety co-workers attribute
high value to SPs’ contributions.
med(qCoWorkers) ∈ {h, vh} ∧med(qValOfContrib) ∈ {m, h, vh}
hPosSelfImg: SPs perceive their contribution as highly valuable. med(qValOfContrib) ∈ {h, vh} ∧med(qCoWorkers) ∈ {m, h, vh}
Comparative Hypotheses
hExp:DivGTSing: SPs with high diverse expertise better perform in
safety activities) than SPs with low singular expertise.
∀o ∈ {a, b}:med(qImpOfExpo) ∈ {a, sa} ∧med(qImpOfExpc) ∈
{nand , a, sa}
hValue:SenLTJun: Senior SPs attribute lower value to their role in the
system life-cycle than junior SPs (cf. hSafIsValued, hPosSelfImg).
One-sidedU succeeds with p < 0.05
hAdapt:SenGTJun: Senior SPs agree more than junior SPs that skill
adaptation (e.g. learning) is required and takes place (cf.
hSPsAdptSkls).
One-sidedU succeeds with p < 0.05
hAdapt:AutoGTAero: SPs using automotive standards agree more than
SPs using aerospace standards that skill adaptation (e.g. learning) is
required and takes place (cf. hSPsAdptSkls).
One-sidedU succeeds with p < 0.05
hInsufMeth:EngDifSci: Engineering-focused SPs agree different from
research-focused SPs with hInsufMeth.
Two-sidedU succeeds with p < 0.05
hInsufMeth:AutoGTAero: SPs using automotive standards agree more
than SPs using aerospace standards with hInsufMeth.
One-sidedU succeeds with p < 0.05
hLoCollLoSaf: A lack of collaboration of safety and security
engineers has a negative impact on safety activities. Accord-
ing to Conway [48], the structure of an engineered system
converges towards the (communication) structure of its
engineering organisation. For example, in a safety-critical
distributed embedded system (e.g. avionics, process au-
tomation, and automotive architectures), team collabora-
tion would determine the architectural decomposition and
direct communication links in the architecture. However,
team collaboration not necessarily implies keeping track
of the impact of critical changes across all critical rela-
tionships. It is also known that critical relationships in
a complex architecture are far from obvious. Sadly, such
relationships are sometimes only indirectly perceived as
an undesired emergent property. Hence, we ask SPs about
the collaborations between so-called “property engineers,”
e.g. safety and security engineers (qIntOfSafSec).
hSafIsRel: SPs understand safety as a special case of re-
liability. Leveson [49] stresses an observed misconcep-
tion about system safety, namely that the responsibility to
make systems safe enough is reduced to the responsibility
to make their critical parts just reliable enough. Her claim
stimulates the question to which extent SPs are solely
driven by reliability concerns and which negative impli-
cations this might have. Moreover, hSafIsRel is also moti-
vated by examinations [50] of how findings from previous
accidents can be included in safety arguments.
hAdapt:AutoGTAero: SPs using automotive standards agree
more than SPs using aerospace standards that skill adapta-
tion is required and takes place. During our interviews we
heard several times that system safety practice in the auto-
motive domain is for several reasons less developed than
in other domains, such as aerospace. Hence, we assume
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that automotive SPs are currently more strongly involved
in or aware of skill development in their domain than SPs
in aerospace.
3.5. Data Collection Procedure: Sampling
To draw a diverse sample of safety practitioners, we
1. advertise our survey on safety-related on-line discus-
sion channels,
2. invite practitioners and researchers in safety-related
domains from our social networks, and
3. ask these people to disseminate information about
our survey.
Our sampling procedure can best be described as a mix-
ture of opportunity, volunteer, and cluster-based sampling.
The cluster is formed by survey participants from several
of these channels. We expect to get a sample stronger
than non-probabilistic but, because of a lack of control of
the sampling process, weaker than uniformly random.
Sample Representativeness. To check how well our final
sample appropriately represents safety practice and its prac-
titioners, the questionnaire measures the classification cri-
teria in Table 1. See [13] for the question used for this.
3.6. Analysis Procedure
This section describes the analysis of the responses, the
checking of the working hypotheses, and our tooling.
3.6.1. Analysis of Responses
We use instruments of descriptive statistics [51] such as
median (med), mean (µ), variance (var), and frequency
histograms to summarise the responses per question.
Half-Open and Open Questions. Some questions of our
questionnaire are half-open, that is, we allow to add an-
other answer option by providing an extra scale and a text
field, and some questions are open, that is, we only provide
a text field.
Particularly, most demographic questions are half-open
multiple-choice (MC) questions, that is, they have an ex-
tra text field “Other”. We use the answers from this text
field to extend and revise the classifications imposed by
the given answer options. See Section 4.2 for the results.
Furthermore, we close some of the main questions us-
ing qualitative content analysis and coding [52]. For some
half-open questions, we extend the statement lists and
nominal scales accordingly. The results of this step are
shown in Section 4.3 when discussing the questions in the
Sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.9, 4.3.11 and 4.3.12.
3.6.2. Hypothesis Analysis and Statistical Tests
We use non-statistical analysis for all base hypotheses
for which we directly5 collect data (Table 5).
For most comparative hypotheses, we apply the MANN-
WHITNEYU test [51] (U for short) to check for difference.
We use U if the following assumptions hold:
• exactly one LIKERT-type or ordered-categorical de-
pendent variable (DV),
• random division into two groups,
• group members are not paired,
• treatments via independent variables (IV) are already
applied,
• group sizes may differ and be small (< 30),
• per-group distributions of the DV may be dissimilar
and non-GAUSSIAN.
Let H be a hypothesis and α be the maximum chance
of a Type I error, that is, incorrect rejection of the null hy-
pothesisH0. U tries to rejectH0 with a confidence of 1−α.
We require p < α for the Type I error p of incorrectly dis-
tinguishing two groups of respondents with respect to H.
If U succeeds to reject H0 then the support of the de-
sired alternative hypothesis H1 is increased. Failure of
U in rejecting H0 (i.e., p ≥ α) denies any conclusion on
H from the given data set [53, p. 168]. The medium ma-
turity and criticality of our hypotheses (for an exploratory
study) and the medium accuracy of our data (from a sur-
vey method) make it reasonable to stick with the typical
choice of α = 0.05.
Acceptance Criteria (AC). The criteria in Table 5 describe
the aggregation of the question scales in Table 3 to match
the hypotheses. These criteria are built from symbols
of the kind q〈id〉〈answer option〉〈scale value(s)〉 referring to the questions
in Table 4. We require med to be non-central to ex-
press a large supportive majority. Alternatively, percent-
age thresholds (e.g. > 25%) express the desired variance
or shape of the distribution. In hypothesis tests, we mainly
use classification criteria (Table 1) as IVs.
3.6.3. Tooling
We use Unipark6 as a platform for implementing on-line
surveys and for data collection (Section 3.5) and tempo-
rary storage. For statistical analysis and data visualisa-
tion (Section 3.6.2) we use GNU R7 and Unipark. Content
analysis and coding takes place in typical spreadsheet ap-
plications.
5For example, our construct envisages hypothesis hInsufMeth to refer
to Adequacy of means. However, to keep our questionnaire lean, with
question qAppOfMeth, we directly measure agreement for one instance
of this hypothesis.
6See http://www.unipark.de.
7See https://www.r-project.org.
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3.7. Validity Procedure after Survey Planning
In the following, we evaluate the face and content va-
lidity of our instrument, and the internal and construct
validity of our study. Although, we did not perform an in-
dependent pilot study according to [29], we took several
measures to assess the validity of our study.
3.7.1. Instrument Evaluation: Face and Content Validity
First, both authors performed several internal walk-
throughs to improve the survey design and the data anal-
ysis procedure.
Second, along the lines of a focus group, we asked inde-
pendent persons to complete the questionnaire and to pro-
vide feedback via an extra form field in the questionnaire
and via email. This dry run took place between 13 and 27
June 2017. We gathered 7 independent responses, from
2 postgraduate research assistants with experience in the
survey method, and with experience in safety-critical soft-
ware, systems, and requirements engineering, 1 master
student with industrial work experience in safety-critical
systems engineering, 1 IT practitioner and English native
speaker, 1 person with a health and safety background, 2
persons with a software engineering background.
The feedback from the these respondents resulted in
• an extension and balancing of answer options,
• the alignment of answer scales throughout the whole
questionnaire,
• improvement of the nomenclature (terms are now de-
scribed on the questionnaire page they first appear).
• an extension of open answer fields, and
• linguistic improvements.
These steps helped us to improve questionnaire complete-
ness, consistency, and comprehensibility and reduce re-
searcher bias [13, Sec. 3.3.4].
3.7.2. Internal Validity of the Analysis Procedure
Why would the procedure in Section 3 lead to reason-
able and justified results?
U is applicable only if groups are independent with
respect to the considered IV. This circumstance can
cause problems with MC-questions. For example, with
qNotionOfSafety, the same respondents might be in both
groups “all data points with choice (c)” and “all data
points with choice (a).” Hence, these groups contain data
points that can be dependent in a certain but unknown
way. For comparisons with U, we reduce this issue by
converting the responses to single-choice questions using
discriminating features such as the time of the first answer
option chosen.
The 7 test data points allowed us to validate our tool-
ing (e.g. R scripts, see Section 3.6.3). Test data points are
not included in the final data set.
3.7.3. Construct Validity
Why would the construct (Section 3.1.1) appropriately
represent the phenomenon to investigate?
Because of the exploratory nature of our study, the sub-
constructs and their scales in Table 2 represent the study
object as reconstructed from our analyses. The working
hypotheses and the questionnaire represent an approx-
imation and a selection of what needs to be measured
and tested if we were to investigate this study object (cf.
Figure 2) in an explanatory study. For example, we as-
sume that the 10 statements in Figure 18 for question
qIntOfSafSec satisfactorily approximate the “interaction of
safety and security activities” (i.e., construct Collabora-
tion) and its criticality. Consequently, the scales in Table 2
serve as a reference to the internal validation of our study.
Not being unusual for an exploratory study, several of
the hypotheses are relatively weak and, therefore, even if
accepted from our collected data, only allow the deriva-
tion of restricted conclusions. For example, an accepted
hFMsImprSaf (i.e., FMs have a positive impact) reflects
very much the personal experience, perception, or opin-
ion of our survey participants. Their view has to be dis-
tinguished from the question of actual FM effectiveness.
To pursue such a question, we have to refine our research
design using the technology acceptance model [54] and con-
trolled field experiments.
Our inquiry of SPs about supportive factors and obsta-
cles in safety decision making does not include safety ev-
idence traceability and management. A future version of
our construct and questionnaire should therefore include
the criteria examined by Nair et al. [24], De la Vara et
al. [26] and Borg et al. [25].
Our construct and instrument are essentially new. How-
ever, the Constituents overlap with the construct used
in [22] for safety process maturity assessment. Further-
more, Manotas et al. [55] employs a research design anal-
ogous to ours, underpinning the appropriateness of our
approach to survey engineering practitioners. Despite
the drawbacks discussed before, we believe our design is
appropriate with respect to the expressive power of the
working hypotheses. In summary, this construct can be a
helpful guidance in the design of successive studies.
3.7.4. Reliability
A check for test-retest reliability (e.g. changing attitudes
of respondents) and alternate form reliability are out of
scope of this exploratory study. Hence, we do not plan
to ask respondents to answer the questionnaire more than
once and we run only one variant of the questionnaire.
4. Survey Results
In this section, we characterise our sample (Sec-
tion 4.2), summarise the responses (Section 4.3), and
analyse our hypotheses (Section 4.4).
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Table 6: Safety-related channels we advertised our survey on (sorted
alphabetically by category, full list in [13, pp. 92f])
Channel Type Example/References
Facebook sites E.g. Int. Society of SPs
General panels SurveyCircle, www.surveycircle.com
LinkedIn groups E.g. on ARP 4754, DO-178, ISO 26262
Mailing lists E.g. system safety (U Bielefeld,8 formerly U York)
Newsletters GI requirements engineering
Personal web-
sites
E.g. profiles on Twitter, LinkedIn, Xing
ResearchGate Q&A forums on www.researchgate.net
Xing groups E.g. safety engineering
Other channels E.g. board of certified safety professionals
4.1. Survey Execution: Sample Size and Response Rate
For the collection of data from the survey participants,
we
1. advertised our survey over the channels in Table 6
and
2. personally invited > 20 persons.
The sampling period lasted from 1 July 2017 til 25 Septem-
ber 2017. In this period, we repeated step 1 up to three
times to increase the number of participants. The Unipark
tracking data shows that LinkedIn groups, ResearchGate,
Twitter, and mailing lists were effective in soliciting re-
spondents, however, it is incomplete and, hence, does not
disclose which channels were most effective.
After 565 views of the questionnaire, our final sample
contains N ′ = 124 (partial) responses with N = 93 com-
pleted questionnaires and N = 91 (73%) complete9 data
points. Figure 3 depicts the distribution of responses over
time. According to our questionnaire tool, respondents
spent 20 minutes on average to provide complete data
points, 50% spent within 14 and 24 minutes time.
Given the numbers of members for some channels we
used (e.g. for LinkedIn groups), we estimate the return
rates of responses per channel to range from 0.1 to 5%.
From the sub-groups, we can build from the sample ac-
cording to our classification criteria, the smallest we like
to reason about below are of the size of around 15.
Appendix A provides a detailed enumeration of data
summaries (i.e., number of answers per option) for all
questions.
4.2. Description of the Sample
We describe our sample in the following and estimate
the extent to which it represents (Section 3.5) the popu-
lation of SPs. For each classification criterion according
to Table 1, we provide a chart or we name the up to 10
8See http://www.systemsafetylist.org.
9Apart from two options of the classification question Safety-related
Roles (66, 76) and the question qPosImpOfFMs (62), we had at least 91
up to 124 responses for each question.
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Figure 3: History of responses
Other Discipline
Physics & Mathematics
Systems Engineering
Mechanical & Aerospace Engineering
Safety Science
Electrical & Electronics Engineering
Computer Science
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3.95% (N=6)
7.89% (N=12)
8.55% (N=13)
14.47% (N=22)
15.13% (N=23)
20.39% (N=31)
32.24% (N=49)
N = 156 
Figure 4: Educational Background (frequency, MC)
most frequently occurring answers, ordered by frequency.
Percentages (%) right of the bars indicate the fraction of
the 93 completed questionnaires, shown in parentheses
the (N)umber of respondents who chose the correspond-
ing option. Note that most of the classification questions
allow MC answers (cf. Table 1 and [13, pp. 56ff]).
Educational Background. Figure 4 summarises the educa-
tional background of all respondents:
• Computer scientists include software engineers and
computer engineers
• Electrical and electronics engineers
• Safety scientists include safety engineers, occupational
safety practitioners, health and safety practitioners,
human factors engineers, ergonomics engineers
• Mechanical and aerospace engineers
• Systems engineers include poly-technical systems engi-
neers, information systems engineers, business tech-
nologists, engineering business administrators, engi-
neering project managers
• Physicists and mathematicians
• Other discipline includes chemists, biochemists, civil
engineers, language scientists
Application Domains. Figure 5 summarises the applica-
tion domain of all respondents where “aerospace” includes
space telescopes; “industrial processes and plant automa-
tion” includes manufacturing, chemical processes, oil and
gas, energy infrastructure, and small power plants; “rail-
way systems” includes railway signalling; “construction
and building automation” includes civil engineering appli-
cations; and “other domains” includes food safety, biolog-
ical safety, research and development, and environment,
health, and safety preparations.
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Figure 6: Level of Experience (time intervals in years)
Level of Experience. Figure 6 indicates that our sample of
SPs is moderately balanced across all experience levels.
Familiarity with Standards. Figure 7 provides an overview
of safety-related standards our respondents are familiar
with (distinguished by generality or by application do-
main): Standards from aerospace (e.g. ARP 4761, DO-
178, DO-254), generic standards (e.g. ISO 61508, DIN
VDE 0801) automotive (e.g. ISO 26262), machinery (e.g.
ISO 13849, 25199, DIN EN 62061, MRL 2006/42/EG),
military (e.g. MIL-STD 882, UK Def Std 00-55), rail-
way (e.g. CENELEC EN 50126, 50128, 51029, 62061),
power plants (e.g. IEC 60880, 61513, 62138, 60987,
62340, IEC 800), and medical devices (e.g. IEC 80001,
ISO 14971, AAMI/UL 2800). 14 participants were neither
familiar with any of the given standards nor did they spec-
ify other standards.
Familiarity with Methods. Figure 8 shows the familiarity
of our respondents with prevalent concepts of safety anal-
ysis and the corresponding classes of methods, techniques,
or notations:10 For example, FMEA, FMECA, or FMEDA to
assess failure mode effects; HazOp studies, ergonomic work
analysis and intervention methodology to assess hazard
operability; STAMP-based methods for hazard (STPA) and
accident (CAST) analysis; FHA, FFA, PHA, or PHL to as-
sess risk at a functional or abstract design level; common
cause (CCA) or common mode (CMA) analysis to include
dependencies and interactions; fault injection and prop-
erty checking as techniques of automated validation and
verification (V&V); STRIDE or CORAS to assess and han-
dle security threats; bidirectional methods such as Bowties
10Abbreviations are described in Table B.9 in Appendix B.
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Figure 7: Familiarity with Standards and use by domain (frequency, MC)
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Figure 8: Familiarity with Methods and concepts (frequency, MC)
or cause-consequence analysis; MARKOV chains for prob-
abilistic risk analysis, and GSN and SACM to build assur-
ance cases. For “Other”, our participants mentioned a va-
riety of approaches (no more than twice): 5S, 5W, CASS,
coexistence analysis, FRAM, HazRAC, HEART, HRA, MTA,
(O)SHA, SAR, SCRA, SHARD, SSHA, Poka Yoke, prognos-
tic analysis, WBA, ZHA, ZSA.
Only 4 respondents state familiarity with methods to as-
sess and handle security threats. 15 respondents neither
checked any of the given methods nor did they specify other
methods that are relevant in their safety activities.
Geographical Regions. DE (24.3%), UK (16.4%), US
(15.3%), AU (6.2%), FR (5.1%), IT (3.4%), CA (3.4%),
CN (2.8%), and CH (2.8%).
Native Languages. Figure 9 provides an overview of the
languages spoken by the respondents.
Working Languages. Figure 10 provides an overview of
the languages used at work by the respondents.
Safety-related Roles. In Figure 11, the term practitioner
includes the profile of an engineer and a manager. Re-
garding engineering disciplines and domains, “safety prac-
titioner” includes engineers or managers in system safety,
functional safety, or in other safety domains as well as
technology risk managers in general; “software practi-
tioner” includes developers, architects, and tool devel-
opers; “systems practitioners” includes system analysts
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Figure 9: Native Languages and concepts (frequency, MC)
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Figure 10: Working Languages and concepts (frequency, MC)
and system architects; “health & safety practitioner” in-
cludes occupational safety practitioners, human factors
engineers, and ergonomists; and “V & V practitioner” in-
cludes test and assurance practitioners. For “Other”, our
respondents include a civil engineer, a project manager, a
method engineer, and a maintainability engineer.
Regarding responsibility profiles, the category “Consul-
tant / Assessor” includes independent evaluators, audi-
tors, regulators, and inspectors dealing with safety certi-
fication.
4.3. Summary of Responses
In this section, we summarise the responses to the ques-
tions in Table 4.
Guide to the Figures. The following text and figures com-
plement each other. For LIKERT-type scales, we use
centred diverging stacked bar charts as recommended
by [56]. med denotes the median and “ex” indicates the
number of excluded data points per answer option.
4.3.1. qValueOfKnow: Value of Knowledge Sources
Figure 12 shows that, among the knowledge sources we
asked our participants to rate, expert opinion, previous ex-
perience in safety-related projects, and case reports repre-
sent the three highest valued knowledge sources used in
safety activities and safety decision making. Management
recommendations turn out to be the lowest valued knowl-
edge source.
The following knowledge sources, or resources in more
general, were additionally mentioned to be of very high or
high value:
Four respondents referred to the concept of adversar-
ial thinking, mentioning “creative mind”, “imagination”,
“analysis capability,” and “acceptance of human fallibil-
ity.” Three respondents pointed to the concept of domain
expertise and experience, mentioning “gut feel”, “subject
matter knowledge of the application,” and “...real work
and related problems in reference situations...” Further-
more, they mentioned education, specification documents
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Figure 11: Safety-related Roles (frequency, MC) split into disci-
plines (top) and responsibility profiles (bottom)
1%
2%
5%
4%
13%
9%
45%
92%
84%
80%
70%
53%
42%
17%
7%
14%
15%
26%
35%
49%
39%
(a) Hazard list from previous
projects, med=High, ex=0
(b) Case (accident, incident)
reports, med=High, ex=0
(c) Inspection checklist,
med=High, ex=0
(d) Expert opinions,
med=High, ex=0
(e) Management
recommendations, med=Medium,
ex=0
(f) Co−workers'
recommendations, med=Medium,
ex=0
(g) Safety−related project
experience, med=Very high,
ex=0
100 50 0 50 100
Percentage
Very low
(5)
Low
(4)
Medium
(3)
High
(2)
Very high
(1)
Figure 12: qValueOfKnow (N = 97): Value of knowledge sources – Of
how much value are specific knowledge sources for safety decision mak-
ing?
and tools (e.g. “use of SPARK”), independent assessment,
in-service monitoring logs, and previously certified similar
systems.
4.3.2. qImpOfConstr: Constraints on Safety Activities
According to Figure 13, inexperienced safety engi-
neers (g) and erroneous hazard analyses (e) gained the
most ratings in the category “significant negative impact
on safety activities.” Postponed safety decisions (c) achieved
the largest consensus. Vague safety standards (f) consti-
tutes the bottom of this ranking but is still rated with
medium or high negative impact by the majority of re-
spondents.
The following factors (i.e., process constraints and is-
sues) were additionally mentioned to have high negative
impact on safety activities:
Eight respondents broach the issue of missing manage-
ment expertise and support: “Lack of education of man-
agers in need for safety” identifies one respondent from
the oil and gas industry. Another one states that there
is a “general perception that safety is only paper work”
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Figure 13: qImpOfConstr (N = 100): Negative impact on safety activi-
ties – To which extent do specific process constraints and issues negatively
impact safety activities?
and perceives a “lack of safety knowledge within manage-
ment.” One practitioner was even pointing to a “lack of
general safety culture.”
Three participants criticise that the degree of collabora-
tion is too low: They perceive a “lack of system level engi-
neering experience” as well as “soloed working practices
without a clear view of [an] integrated safety concept” and
that the organisation is “minimising [the] involvement of
safety process/engineers into [the] development process.”
Regarding incomplete or inadequate hazard lists, respon-
dents mention “unidentified hazard domains” and “imag-
ined safety cases not based on real workers experience.”
Along with that, one practitioner mentions the issue of
“poorly defined requirements”: Such requirements, when
coming from upstream, are known to have a negative ef-
fect on many downstream engineering activities. Con-
versely, inadequate hazard lists resulting from such activi-
ties can again have a negative impact on downstream sub-
system requirements specification.
Regarding compliance with norms, one respondent was
criticising the “transfer of concern from assessment to
compliance,” in other words, compliance bias. Two oth-
ers are broaching the opposite phenomenon of compliance
ignorance, mentioning “general ISO 26262 standard igno-
rance” and a “lack of understanding of regulatory frame-
work.”
Furthermore, according to another participant’s experi-
ence there is “too much faith in testing” and “reluctance
to use formal methods.”
4.3.3. qImpOfEco: Influence of Economic Factors
More than a third (36%) of the survey participants
share the view that economic factors often strongly in-
fluence the way how hazards are handled, about half of
them (48%) think that such influence happens rarely or
occasionally (median), and for 9% such influences are not
recognisable.
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Figure 14: qAdeqOfMthStd (N = 102): Adequacy of methods and stan-
dards – Regarding a specific application domain, how adequate are appli-
cable safety standards and methods in ensuring safety?
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Figure 15: qAppOfMeth (N = 97): Applicability of methods – The ap-
plication of conventional techniques (e.g. FMEA and FTA) has become too
difficult for complex applications of recent technologies.
4.3.4. qAdeqOfMthStd: Adequacy of Methods and Stan-
dards
According to Figure 14, traffic control (f) and medical
and healthcare applications (e) are most often believed to
be supported by adequate methods and standards. How-
ever, for all domains, at least 50% of the respondents think
that the available means are only slightly or not at all ad-
equate for safety assurance. This question exhibits a rela-
tively large number of dnk-answers.
4.3.5. qAppOfMeth: Applicability of Methods
The nand-median in Figure 15 shows that there is no
tendency or no clear consensus among respondents on
whether or not conventional methods have become too
difficult to apply in current applications.
4.3.6. qPosImpOfFMs: Positive Impact of Formal Methods
The median of “medium impact” in Figure 16 indicates
a consensus among the participants on that the use of FMs
might have a positive impact on the effectiveness of safety
activities. However, we only have a low number of re-
sponses resulting from missing answers and we excluded
dnk-answers.
4.3.7. qImprOfSkills: Improvement of Skills
According to Figure 17, SPs agree moderately (39%) to
strongly (54%) with the requirement to adapt their profes-
sional skills to new technologies. However, significantly
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Figure 16: qPosImpOfFMs (N = 58): Positive impact of formal methods
– Estimate the positive impact of formal methods on safety activities and
system safety.
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Figure 17: qImprOfSkills (N = 96): Improvement of skills – Specify
your level of agreement with 4 statements about factors improving a SP’s
skills.
less consensus was achieved among the respondents on
whether junior SPs should learn from accident reports.
4.3.8. qIntOfSafSec: Interaction of Safety and Security
The high moderate and strong agreement in Figure 18
indicates that most of our participants perceive interac-
tions between safety and security as critical.
SPs clearly agree on that interaction between safety
and security practitioners during requirements engineer-
ing and system assurance rarely occurs (g,f). Furthermore,
clear agreement is achieved for the “negative influence of
a lack of collaboration (between safety and security en-
gineers)” (h,i) and for the “positive influence of such a
collaboration” (j) on safety activities. However, we ac-
knowledge 7% of disagreement with the “requirement of
ultimate IT security for safety.”
No clear consensus is achieved regarding the dependence
of security on safety (b,d). As opposed to that, respondents
agree on the dependence of safety on security (a,c,e).
4.3.9. qNotionOfSafety: Notion of Safety
The multiple-choice answers in Figure 19 show that
many participants seem to be reluctant to associating
cost/benefit schemes with management decision making
in system safety (a,b). Accordingly, many responses in-
dicate that safety is treated as a cost-independent neces-
sity (c). However, 51 (32%) responses were given to the
view of safety as an “important, yet secondary, and tedious
mandated issue” (d,e).
Beyond the five given answer options, the notions of
safety additionally given by our respondents range from a
“huge effort generating source”, a “marketing gadget”, a
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Figure 18: qIntOfSafSec (N = 95): Interaction of safety and security –
Specify your level of agreement with 10 statements about the interaction
of safety and security activities.
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Figure 19: qNotionOfSafety (N = 95, MC): Frequency of safety notions
– How is safety viewed in your field of practice? It is viewed as . . .
“high level product performance characteristic”, a “regu-
lation”, a “general and common demand”, a “must have”
up to being “essential.”
Importantly, two respondents add that it depends “on the
manager or the engineer” or “on the stakeholder and on
the safety professional.” An ergonomist with 3 to 7 years
of work experience says that “ergonomists usually are seen
as added value to [the field] because we try to work to
improve performance and health at the same time, safety
is the natural outcome of this methodology.”
4.3.10. qPrioOfSafety: Priority of Safety
From Figure 20, we can see a clear consensus of the
respondents for all given options (a–d). Particularly, in-
creased priority of safety decisions (a) and defined safety
processes (d) positively contribute to the efficiency of
safety activities. The Sections 4.3.11 and 4.3.12 provide
more details on the factors believed to increase the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of safety activities as well as dual
factors assumed to decrease the efficiency and effective-
ness thereof. Along the way, comparably many SPs (17%)
do not offer any agreement on authority (c).
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Figure 20: qPrioOfSafety (N = 97): Efficiency of safety activities – Spec-
ify your level of agreement with several statements about factors increas-
ing the efficiency in safety activities.
4.3.11. qEffRoleOnJob: Effect of Role Model on a SP’s Job
We asked our respondents to comment on whether and
how their job is affected by a clear definition of their role, if
any, in their organisations and application domains.
Apart from 5 dnk-answers, we received 56 answers say-
ing “yes” and, thus, stating that the role of a SP is clearly
defined. These SPs perceive or expect the following positive
consequences on their job (frequency given in parentheses,
in descending order): Clear role definitions . . .
• have a general positive impact on a SP’s activi-
ties (24),
• lead to clear responsibilities, authority, and escalation
routes (13),
• allow good integration of safety activities into the sur-
rounding system life cycle processes (6),
• can make the achievement of compliance easier (1),
and
• let SPs maintain autonomy or independence to carry
through their most critical activities (1).
However, our study participants report on the following
negative effects on their job: Clear role definitions can . . .
• make engineers entirely push away safety-related re-
sponsibilities as a consequence of separating teams
into safety and non-safety co-workers (2),
• lead to complex process definitions (1),
• get rather independent SPs exposed to company-wide
resource and risk management (1), and
• impose a wrong focus or unnecessarily constrain a
SP’s tasks (1).
Moreover, 30 participants responded with a “no” and,
hence, state that the role of a SP is not clearly defined.
These SPs consider or expect the following positive conse-
quence on their job: Unclear role definitions . . .
• may promote more freedom to act, for example, to
develop and employ new and more effective safety
approaches (3).
However, our respondents also perceive several negative
effects on their job: Unclear role definitions . . .
• can entail unclear or wrong responsibilities as well
as limited authority, autonomy, and space for discre-
tionary activity (9),
• promote unclear, one-sided, or late decision making,
in the worst case, rushed processing of checklists (6),
• have a general negative impact on a SP’s tasks (4),
• can lead to disintegrated conceptions of safety, sepa-
rated communities with a lack of communication and
coordination, promoting unnecessarily confined deci-
sions (3),
• can decrease the appreciation of a SP’s analysis capa-
bilities (2), and
• increase the risk of unqualified personnel assuming
the role of a SP (2).
4.3.12. qEffNotionOnJob: Effect of Safety Notion on a SP’s
Job
We asked our respondents to comment on whether
and how their job is affected by a predominant notion of
safety (qNotionOfSafety), if any, in their organisations and
application domains.
Apart from 9 dnk-answers, we received 74 answers indi-
cating a “yes” and, hence, stating that the notion of safety
has an effect on their job: 10 respondents do not provide a
specific comment. The others argue from several notions
of safety they have perceived in their environments. Below,
we provide answer frequencies and cite a few answers un-
derpinning the summary statements.
Non-supportive Notions of Safety. 24 participants describe
their experiences with a non-supportive, misunderstood, or
underrated safety culture. They report that . . .
. . . SPs have difficulties to argue their findings (9): “Right
now there is no ability to have the safety requirement
override standard functional requirements.” – “1. Our job
always gets delayed and we are the last to get the inputs.
2. Non-safety engineers always try to justify or avoid the
suggestions/findings. 3. It is difficult to sell safety culture
to non-safety engineers/managers.” – “I have to spend ex-
tra time explaining that safety is not about compliance or
implementing controls.” – “As for now safety has not the
degree of importance to support testing views and argu-
ments against system designers and management.”
. . . SPs suffer from late decision making (5): “If I am not
allowed to do my job early in the process (requirements
stage), safety becomes more costly and I as a safety practi-
tioner am viewed as a late check in the box to get through
a program rather than an integral part of a design team.”
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. . . SPs’ activities have no lasting value (1): “The safety
practitioner is neither equipped, nor capable of making
the decisions needed for a higher level of safety. Being
mostly policemen, enforcers and rule designers, little if
any of their contributions have any meaningful or lasting
value.”
Supportive Notions of Safety. 20 respondents describe
their experiences with or their view of a supportive or
highly-valued safety culture. They report that . . .
. . . SPs’ findings are important and heard (6): “My job is
important because safety is valued and considered neces-
sary.” – “Most people in my organisation understand the
importance of safety. This is positive.” – “There are not
many people who practice safety, since it is a tedious job.
So we are highly valued.”
. . . SPs are properly included in the process (1): “Safety
is fundamental to the work we do and is ingrained into
our processes in such a way that its impossible to ignore.
While it makes jobs harder with much more analysis and
review processes and every stage of the product’s develop-
ment, we know its vital.”
Other Notions of Safety. 9 SPs describe an ambivalent pic-
ture, saying that it depends on individual projects whether
their jobs are negatively or positively affected: “Safety at
the last two places I worked is a check box activity at best.
Other places I’ve worked it was started early in the pre-
design phase. Starting early is more cost and schedule
effective with a better end product.”
5 SPs refer to a regulation-driven notion of safety: “Posi-
tively affected. In aerospace, safety is part of fundamental
engineering principles, so the process is embedded in sys-
tems engineering and does not get left out.”
From a budget- or schedule-driven perspective, respon-
dents (4) observe that “the budget for tools and training
is never enough” and that “resources, budget, support de-
pend on the view/culture of safety.”
Finally, 12 respondents claim, by saying “no”, that the
notion of safety does not have any effect on their jobs.
4.3.13. qUndesiredEv: Role of Undesired Events for Safety
Figure 21 shows a clearly disagreeing response on
whether lack of failures reduces the need for carrying
through safety activities (a). We have a more ambigu-
ous agreement on whether safety implies reliability (e),
that is, on whether having assured the safety of a sys-
tem usually includes having also assured the reliability of a
system. Moreover, known and reported accidents seem
to be important for the argumentation of the need for
safety (b,c). However, the agreement on whether a “lack
of accidents weakens arguments for the need of safety” (d)
varies more.
4.3.14. qValOfContrib: Value of SPs’ Contributions
According to Figure 22a, the majority of respondents
perceives their role in the system life cycle as highly valu-
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Figure 21: qUndesiredEv (N = 97): Role of undesired events (i.e., fail-
ures, incidents, and accidents) for safety – Rate your level of agreement
with 5 statements about safety activities.
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(a) qValOfContrib (N = 95): Value of SPs’ contributions – Of how much
value is your role as a practitioner or researcher in safety-critical system
developments?
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(b) qCoWorkers (N = 95): Viewing SPs’ co-workers – How much value do
non-safety co-workers attribute to the role of a safety practitioner?
Figure 22: Self-perception of SPs’ role
able or better. The analysis and comments in the Sec-
tions 4.3.11 and 4.3.12 provide a more differentiated pic-
ture of this answer.
4.3.15. qCoWorkers: Viewing SPs’ Co-workers
Figure 22b suggests that the respondents vary strongly
in evaluating their contributions to the system life-cycle
when trying to imagine their non-safety co-workers appre-
ciation.
4.3.16. qImpOfExp: Influence of Experience
From the responses, Figure 23 shows that experience
in safety activities is believed to be positively associated
with improved hazard handling (a,b), particularly, experi-
ence from similar previous projects (b). Adversarial think-
ing (c) receives the least agreement.
4.4. Hypothesis Analysis and Test Results
Table 7 presents the test results for all hypotheses listed
in Table 5 and based on the summary in Section 4.3. Mo-
tivations for the acceptance criteria given in Table 5 are
provided in Section 3.4.1. In summary, we were not able
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Figure 23: qImpOfExp (N = 96): Role of experience – Specify your
level of agreement with 3 statements about the role of experience and
adversarial thinking in safety activities.
to find significant differences for the pairs of groups (IVs)
we compared with respect to several DVs.
5. Discussion
We interpret the responses (Section 5.1), draw a rela-
tionship to existing evidence (Section 5.2), and critically
assess the validity of our study (Section 5.4). From these
discussions, we derive our conclusions in Section 6.
5.1. Interpretation of the Results and Findings
The following discussion takes into account the hypoth-
esis analysis and test results summarised in Table 7. De-
tails about hypotheses and questions referred to in the text
can be derived from Tables 4 and 5.
5.1.1. Findings for RQ1: Means of Work in Safety Practice
Hypothesis hExpDecides. The support of hExpDecides
should not be surprising as it mirrors a rather typical situ-
ation in many engineering disciplines and projects. How-
ever, relying too much on knowledge of experts can in the
worst case go along with relying on a single point of failure
of an organisation. Moreover, relying too much on experi-
ence from similar projects can unfortunately go along with
wrongly transferring former conclusions (i.e., project mem-
ory) and not updating them correspondingly.
Finding 1. The responses suggest that safety mainly
depends on expert opinion and project memory.
Hypothesis hInsufStds is supported. With regard to
the offered application domains (qAdeqOfMthStd, Sec-
tion 4.3.4), the result for hInsufStds is clearly negative:
Our responses indicate that inadequate methods or stan-
dards constitute a real issue in current high-automation
safety practice. However, from qImpOfConstr in Figure 13,
we know SPs think that “vague safety standards” are prob-
lematic, though, least problematic of all inquired process
constraints and issues. The 22 to 36 excluded dnk-answers
might stem from the fact that most respondents can only
make a statement for a small subset of the inquired ap-
plication domains. We believe, the exclusion of these re-
sponses does not weaken our observation. Moreover, the
observation of a lack of appropriate standards and certi-
fication guidelines is anecdotally confirmed by McDermid
and Rae [10] and empirically in the automated vehicle
testing domain by Knauss et al. [41, pp. 1878f].
Finding 2. Standards in the considered high automa-
tion domains seem to be inadequate.
Hypothesis hInsufMeth. Because of overlapping Means,
the rejection of hInsufMeth stands in conflict with the sup-
port of hInsufStds. On the one hand, we see a slight
tendency towards the first author’s experience from inter-
views [5, 57, 4] suggesting hInsufMeth to be a justified
hypothesis. On the other hand, ambiguous agreement was
given to “have become too difficult” or, more generally, to
“have become inadequate.” Asking for agreement in ques-
tion qAppOfMeth should have been substituted by asking
for the level of Adequacy. However, we believe it is safe to
interpret the respondents’ agreement that “available stan-
dards and methods have become too difficult” as “they are
challenging to apply.” After all, we conclude that this con-
struct should better be measured by several questions to
get more informative and reliable results.
Finding 3. From our data, we are not able to provide
a clear general picture about the adequacy of means.
The exploratory nature of our questionnaire made it
necessary to sacrifice the level of detail for certain ques-
tions, for example, qAppOfMeth, to keep the question-
naire short enough to be feasible. To get a more detailed
response to this question, it has to be repeated for each
technique and standard and analysed for sensitivity to, for
example, industry-specific sub-groups of respondents. A
more detailed questionnaire is subject of future work (Sec-
tion 6.2).
Hypothesis hFMsImprSaf is supported. The low number of
valid responses to question qPosImpOfFMs certainly weak-
ens the interpretation of the support of hFMsImprSaf.
Both, the question qPosImpOfFMs as well as the notion of
a formal method are very abstract. Moreover, the classifi-
cation questions provide only little knowledge about our
respondents’ experience with FMs.
Finding 4. Among informed respondents, formal
methods are believed to be beneficial.
Certainly, this finding requires another study with a more
specific research design.
5.1.2. Findings for RQ2: Impact of Process Factors
Hypothesis hLoResLoSaf is rejected. Few respondents to
question qEffNotionOnJob experience a lack of resources
for safety activities. This is consistent with the data
checked for the AC of hLoResLoSaf. Although the re-
sponses suggest that the implication lack of resources has
negative impact on safety might hold, the antecedent of this
hypothesis is not broadly supported.
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Table 7: Results of hypotheses analysis for hExpDecides to hPosSelfImg and hypotheses tests for hExp:DivGTSing to hInsufMeth:AutoGTAero. Legend:
AC. . . acceptance criterion
Hypothesis: Construct-based proposition From the responses to . . . . . . we conclude that . . .
hExpDecides: Dependence on expert opinion qValueOfKnow (Section 4.3.1) and
qImpOfExp (Section 4.3.16)
our AC is fulfilled.
hLoResLoSaf: Resources govern performance
of SPs
qImpOfConstr (Section 4.3.2) and
qImpOfEco (Section 4.3.3)
the qImpOfEco-part of our AC is not fulfilled.
hInsufStds: Inadequate means in
high-automation
qAdeqOfMthStd (Section 4.3.4) our AC is fulfilled.
hInsufMeth: Low method adequacy qAppOfMeth (Section 4.3.5) and
qPosImpOfFMs (Section 4.3.6)
the qAppOfMeth-part of our AC is not fulfilled
by the nand-median.
hFMsImprSaf: Positive impact of formal
methods
qPosImpOfFMs (Section 4.3.6) our AC is fulfilled.
hSPsAdptSkls: Necessity of skill adaptation qImprOfSkills (Section 4.3.7) our AC is fulfilled.
hSafBySec: Dependence on IT security qIntOfSafSec (Section 4.3.8) our AC is fulfilled.
hSafIsCost: Safety is a cost-benefit question qNotionOfSafety (Section 4.3.9) the qNotionOfSafety-a-part of our AC is not
fulfilled.
hLoCollLoSaf: Benefit of safety-security
interaction
qIntOfSafSec (Section 4.3.8) our AC is fulfilled.
hHiPrioHiSaf: Benefit of safety-as-a-priority qPrioOfSafety (Section 4.3.10) our AC is fulfilled.
hSafIsRel: Safety is a special case of reliability qUndesiredEv (Section 4.3.13) none of the qUndesiredEv-parts of our AC are
fulfilled.
hSafIsValued: High contribution to life cycle qCoWorkers (Section 4.3.15) and
qValOfContrib (Section 4.3.14)
the qCoWorkers-part of our AC is not fulfilled.
hPosSelfImg: High contribution (self-image) qValOfContrib (Section 4.3.14) and
qCoWorkers (Section 4.3.15)
our AC is fulfilled.
From the comparison of . . . . . . we conclude that . . .
hExp:DivGTSing: Benefit of diverse expertise senior SPs with junior SPs (from responses to
qImpOfExp, Section 4.3.16)
our AC is fulfilled.
hValue:SenLTJun: Assoc. of expertise & value senior SPs with junior SPs with p = 0.15, our AC is not fulfilled.
hAdapt:SenGTJun: Assoc. of expertise & skill
adaptation
senior SPs with junior SPs with p = 0.052, our AC is almost fulfilled.
hAdapt:AutoGTAero: Assoc. of standards &
skill adaptation
SPs using automotive standards with SPs
using aerospace standards
with p = 0.09, our AC is almost fulfilled.
hInsufMeth:EngDifSci: Assoc. of profession &
inadequate means
engineering-focused SPs with
research-focused SPs
with p = 0.12, our AC is not fulfilled.
hInsufMeth:AutoGTAero: Assoc. of standards
& inadequate means
SPs using automotive standards with SPs
using aerospace standards
with p = 0.24, our AC is not fulfilled.
Finding 5. Our data suggest that resources occasion-
ally but not typically govern SPs’ performance.
However, by weakening hLoResLoSaf, we can acknowl-
edge the “often” third of SPs showing a situation demand-
ing for reaction in the community.
Hypothesis hSafIsCost is rejected. We identify a weak pos-
itive association: Safety is most frequently viewed as a
cost-independent necessity (qNotionOfSafety-c, hSafIsCost)
and the median of qImpOfEco (hLoResLoSaf) lies at eco-
nomic factors rarely or occasionally influence safety. So,
for hSafIsCost, the many positive responses to the op-
tions (c,d,e) underpin the view of safety as a cost-
independent factor in management decision making. We
consider this to be positive but like to stress the need of an
in-depth explanatory study to confirm or refute this find-
ing.
Finding 6. Our responses suggest that safety is not typ-
ically a question of cost-benefit.
Hypotheses hLoCollLoSaf is supported. First of all, our data
supports hSafBySec which states that safety assurance
strongly depends on security assurance. Interestingly,
for hLoCollLoSaf, SPs agree on both that . . .
Finding 7. . . . a lack of collaboration or interac-
tion downgrades the performance of safety activi-
ties (qIntOfSafSec-h,i), and
Finding 8. . . . interaction between safety and security
practitioners rarely occurs in requirements and assur-
ance activities (qIntOfSafSec-f,g).
We consider this issue worthwhile to be moni-
tored. Apart from desirable interactions at an or-
ganisational level, potential dependence of security on
safety (qIntOfSafSec-b,d) is less obvious to our re-
spondents than potential dependence of safety on secu-
rity (qIntOfSafSec-a,c,e). While the latter is comparably
well known, the former is more difficult to grasp. Our
data shows this ambiguity but does not explain it.
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Finding 9. Overall, collaboration of safety and security
experts is clearly viewed as beneficial.
Hypothesis hExp:DivGTSing is supported. Although the
three propositions in Figure 23 seem obvious, we in-
cluded them in our questionnaire to confirm that such
occasionally important assumptions are actually made by
SPs (hExp:DivGTSing). For these assumptions to be for-
mulated as a hypothesis and tested accordingly, a fur-
ther investigation would be necessary. Hence, the support
of hExp:DivGTSing is not very informative on its own but
backs the support of hExpDecides.
Finding 10. Diverse expertise is perceived as beneficial
for SPs.
Hypothesis hAdapt:SenGTJun vs. hAdapt:AutoGTAero and
hSPsAdptSkls. Among the comparative hypotheses, only
hAdapt:SenGTJun and hAdapt:AutoGTAero are close to
being supported with p = 0.052 and p = 0.09. The re-
sult for hSPsAdptSkls is unsurprising because senior ex-
perts are professionals with longer experience and might
have witnessed training activities in their field more often
than junior SPs. However, the small difference between
both groups gives rise to the conjecture that senior experts
would avoid outdated skills as much as junior profession-
als would. An almost supported hAdapt:AutoGTAero gives
rise to the conjecture that in automotive, currently in de-
mand of improvement of their safety practices, SPs spend
corresponding effort on skill improvement.
Finding 11. The improvement of skills towards new
technologies is generally agreed among respondents.
5.1.3. Findings for RQ3: Perception of Safety Practice
Hypothesis hSafIsRel is rejected. Similarly, we perceive the
results for hSafIsRel as positive because the issue of “con-
fusing safety with reliability” raised in [49, p. 7, Assump-
tion 1] can at least not be confirmed from the analysis of
our responses. In fact, we observe an opposite tendency
from our sample and assume this to be the effect of those
SPs having been trained on that issue.
Finding 12. It is generally justified to not believe in the
hypothesis “safety is equivalent to reliability.”
From the responses to qUndesiredEv-a, we derive that as-
sured reliability of a system does not reduce the need for
safety activities. Consequently, these responses do not give
rise to believe in the hypothesis reliability implies safety.
However, we might sometimes expect to see agreement on
the hypothesis safety implies reliability (qUndesiredEv-e).
Likewise, our responses are ambiguous in that case. The
most reasonable explanation for this ambiguity is that we
missed to clearly explain what such implications exactly
mean when used as answer options. Moreover, hSafIsRel
is not backed by redundant data. The data gathered
from qUndesiredEv makes it hard to draw a strong con-
clusion. To back a “true extension” of reliability—that is,
safety carries features essentially different from reliabil-
ity or, even more, safety is independent of reliability—we
should have asked questions like “Does reliability imply
safety?” with an expected median of “disagree”.
In conclusion, our data gives rise to the reasonable be-
lief that safety and safety activities are less dependent on
issues of system failures than on the more general issues
of system accidents.
Finding 13. From our responses, we cannot further
characterise the relationship of safety and reliability.
Questions qEffRoleOnJob and qEffNotionOnJob. 56 respon-
dents state that their role is clearly defined. 37 perceive
positive impacts on their activities, particularly, fostering
clear responsibilities, authority, and escalation routes.
30 respondents state that their role is not clearly de-
fined. 15 of them perceive negative impacts in form of
unclear responsibilities, limited authority, autonomy, and
space for discretionary activity as well as unclear or late
decision making (Section 4.3.11).
Finding 14. The role of a SP is often not clearly defined
and SPs experience negative impacts from this.
24 participants experience a non-supportive, misunder-
stood, or underrated safety culture. As opposed to that, 20
respondents perceive a supportive or highly-valued safety
culture. 9 persons provided an ambivalent picture of
safety culture, stating that they have gathered contrasting
experiences (Section 4.3.12).
Finding 15. SPs perceive to a similar extent both, sup-
portive and non-supportive notions of safety.
Hypothesis hPosSelfImg is supported. While responses
to qValOfContrib support hPosSelfImg, the frequent in-
dication of “medium value”, particularly for qCoWorkers,
suggests that some SPs might either not be convinced of
the role, their profession, or even unsatisfied with their
tasks and their job profile. Section 4.3.11 provides some
explanation for such a dissatisfaction coming from an un-
clear role definition and Section 4.3.12 delivers an expla-
nation from a non-supportive safety culture. However, for
a solid conclusion, this indication has to be investigated in
more detail by further studies.
The perception of an SP’s role and contribution by non-
safety co-workers slightly differs from how SPs perceive
their own role. This might not be too surprising be-
cause qValOfContrib and qCoWorkers redundantly mea-
sure fragments of a participant’s self-perception.
Finding 16. SPs seem to be self-confident about their
contribution.
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Table 8: Overview of main findings from hypothesis analysis
RQ1: Which means do SPs typically rely on?
How helpful are those means to them?
RQ2: Which typical process factors have
influence on SPs’ decisions & performance?
RQ3: How do SPs perceive and understand
their role in the process or life cycle?
F1: The responses suggest that safety mainly
depends on expert opinion and project
memory.
F2: Standards in the considered high
automation domains seem to be inadequate.
F3: From our data, we are not able to provide
a clear general picture about the adequacy of
means.
F4: Among informed respondents, formal
methods are believed to be beneficial.
F5: Our data suggest that resources
occasionally but not typically govern SPs’
performance.
F6: Our responses suggest that safety is not
typically a question of cost-benefit.
F7: A lack of collaboration or interaction
downgrades the performance of safety
activities.
F8: Interaction between safety and security
practitioners rarely occurs in requirements
and assurance activities.
F9: Collaboration of safety and security
experts is clearly viewed as beneficial.
F10: Diverse expertise is perceived as
beneficial for SPs.
F11: The improvement of skills towards new
technologies is generally agreed among
respondents.
F12: It is generally justified to not believe in
the hypothesis “safety is equivalent to
reliability.”
F13: Our responses do not offer specific
insights on the relationship between safety
and reliability.
F16: SPs seem to be self-confident about their
contribution.
F14: Their role is often not clearly defined
and SPs experience negative impacts from
this.
F15: SPs perceive to a similar extent both,
supportive and non-supportive notions of
safety.
5.2. Relation to Existing Evidence
In Table 8, we summarise our findings and, below, we
compare them with findings from related studies.
Graaf et al. [18] identify legacy incompatibility, lack of
maturity, and additional complexity of new methods, lan-
guages, and tools as three major obstacles to the early or
timely adoption of such means. Similar obstacles were ob-
served in software testing by Kasurinen et al. [19]. These
observations are consistent with F1 that knowledge from
previous projects has the strongest influence.
Martins and Gorschek [12] observe a lack of evidence
for the usefulness and usability of new approaches from
safety research. Their observation is not in conflict with
finding F4, because SPs can perceive usefulness of new
FMs independent of evidence. The authors perceive a
dominance of conventional approaches in practice which
is again consistent with finding F1. Furthermore, they
observe a lack of studies that investigate how to improve
the communication process throughout the life cycle. F9
indicates that such studies would be of interest to practi-
tioners.
Chen et al. [21] observe that assurance cases can im-
prove cross-disciplinary collaboration but are missing tool
support and experienced personnel. We believe that a lack
of research transfer and training could explain the con-
trast to finding F11, given that assurance cases are seen
as a new method by SPs.
Borg et al. [25] and De la Vara et al. [26] clarify find-
ing F3 at least for the specific case of change impact anal-
ysis in safety practice.
McDermid and Rae [10] could find no satisfactory ex-
planation to their observation that systems got “so safe
despite inadequate and inadequately applied techniques.”
However, their assumption is orthogonal to finding F2,
contrasts finding F3 and certainly emphasises the need
for further empirical research. The lack of consensus
on how to combine case-based [20] and compliance-
based [22] assurance underpins this lack of clarity on the
adequacy of means.
Finding F1 supports the observation of Nair et al. [24]
that expert judgements and checklists are among the most
frequently used references to assess safety arguments and
evidence (see Figure 12). F1 is also shared by Rae and
Alexander [34] who conclude that critical aspects of safety
analysis (e.g. identifying hazards, estimating risk proba-
bility and consequence severity) often rely on expert opin-
ion. Moreover, F1 underpins two out of Wang’s and Wag-
ner’s [23] top ten identified decision making pitfalls.
Leveson [49] observes that safety is pervasively con-
fused (or assumed to correlate) with reliability. The data
for the findings F12 and F13 support her conclusion in
parts, but the consensus of our responses suggests that
there is broad awareness that safety and reliability are first
of all two distinct properties of a system.
In summary, we found related supportive and contrast-
ing evidence regarding most findings for RQ1, RQ2, and
RQ3.
5.3. General Feedback on the Survey
The last page of our questionnaire contains a text field
to leave general comments, for example, an overall opin-
ion, on our survey.
One issue, our survey participants criticised, pertains to
the scope and the terminology used in the questionnaire:
The respondents noted that the inquiry is general and
does not account for the diversity of safety practices in
various industries. Some questions rely on a particular
interpretation of safety practice leaving assumptions im-
plicit and risking to get in conflict with other views of
system safety, for example, “safety by introduction of con-
trols” versus “safety assurance and assessment.” Moreover,
some of the questions are hard to answer because of a lack
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of standardised terminology across domains and because
of missing topics, for example, legal safety requirements
and regulations, human operators, socio-technical systems
were not mentioned.
Although this is justified critique, we found it hard to
arrive at a terminology and at a level of detail suitable
for all SPs while keeping our construct lean (Section 3.1).
After several iterations and an email-based focus group,
we finalised the questionnaire to be released.
When designing our questionnaire, we were driven
by specific not necessarily related findings from previ-
ous studies. Moreover, we had to prioritise and cut the
question catalogue to stay within a maximum duration of
about 30 minutes, an amount of time we believe to be af-
fordable by the participants.
Except for qAdeqOfMthStd and qPosImpOfFMs, the ac-
ceptably low number (< 10%) of dnk-responses indicates
that most respondents did not seem to struggle with an-
swering most of the questions. However, frequent nand-
responses indicate difficulties in deciding on the given an-
swer options (see, e.g. qAppOfMeth).
Another issue raised by our respondents deals with the
survey method and design we applied:
Some questions include bias, drive one to answer in a
particular way and solicit a specific support. LIKERT-scales
impose an abstraction with the risk to deny more accu-
rate answers such as “I often highly agree and sometimes
I strongly disagree.” Moreover, LIKERT-scales should be
substituted by open questions more appropriate for ex-
ploratory studies where the construct is not known or (en-
tirely) fixed beforehand.
On the one hand, we have gained good knowledge
about the construct from previous studies and, on the
other, we provided several possibilities to give open an-
swers and, in fact, present results from their qualitative
analysis (e.g. in the Sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.9, 4.3.11
and 4.3.12). More open questions reduce the risks of bias
and constrained data acquisition. However, it is worth not-
ing that, as opposed to interviews, too many open answers
in large-scale questionnaires can also be demanding for
the respondents and, thus, lead to a high number of par-
tial data points.
5.4. Validity Procedure after Survey Execution
Here, we assess our survey design with respect to inter-
nal and external validity as well as reliability [53, 58].
5.4.1. Internal Validity
To reduce internal threats to validity, we performed
an a-posteriori cross-validation with recommendations on
questionnaire-based surveys in the software and systems
engineering domain [59]. Section 5.3 discusses further ar-
guments for internal validity as a response to the general
feedback on our survey. Additionally, the everyday use of
English among the majority of survey participants (Native
Languages) supports the accuracy of a large fraction of the
data points.
5.4.2. External Validity
To which extent would the procedure in Section 3 lead
to similar results with different samples?
Our sampling procedure is network-guided and, hence,
not uniformly random [51]. However, on the one hand,
from Section 4.2, our sample varies over the scales of
all classification criteria (Table 1). This variation lim-
its potential deficiencies of our sample resulting from an
overlap of the summer holiday season with our sampling
period. On the other hand, regarding the notion of safety
culture, our sample might be biased towards the more fre-
quently occurring backgrounds, domains, and geographi-
cal regions (Section 4.2). However, the lack of evidence
for hInsufMeth:EngDifSci (i.e., practitioners differ from
academics in their view of inadequacy of means) reduces
the extent to which the participation of researchers biases
the results towards a one-sided academic viewpoint.
According to Figure 11, 19 out of 124 respondents
stated that they have been working on safety-related top-
ics as a researcher in academia, that is, the role or respon-
sibility profile which we associate the least of all with gen-
uine practical experience. Only 4 of them declared to
be solely academic researchers. 8 stated to be SPs, too;
7 have also done research in industry; 11 have worked
as software, systems, requirements, reliability, or health
& safety practitioners in addition. This again strengthens
our belief that our results are not biased towards and not
significantly influenced by a purely academic view.
We believe that, in comparison with focus groups and
individual interviews, on-line surveys can be a highly valu-
able instrument in further investigations of this topic.
There are two risks that can be mitigated by anonymous
questionnaires:
1. In collaborations between academia and industry it
is not unlikely that industrial participants in such
projects are from the management, or senior engi-
neers, or research engineers for several reasons not
necessarily regularly connected to the operational
teams. Such collaborations bear the risk that the sam-
ple gets biased towards these roles. With an on-line
survey advertised on multiple channels, we are con-
vinced to have mitigated such a bias.
2. For legal reasons, safety activities can be quite critical
to talk about personally and in an open way. The au-
thors’ experience and impression is that in personal
interviews, practitioners tend to avoid talking loosely
about their organisations and, where aggravating, to
moderately generalise. Our impression from the re-
spondents’ occasionally quite open comments leads
us to believe that the risk of this bias is lower in
anonymous surveys such as our questionnaire. Note
that subjectivity has to be handled by other means in
both questionnaires and interviews.
Leveson [49, p. 211] states that FMEA, with its limited
applicability for safety analysis, is less frequently used as
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a hazard analysis technique than FTA or ETA. As opposed
to Leveson’s observation, our respondents most often
state that they work(ed) with FMEA-based techniques
in their safety activities (cf. Figure 8). One reason for
this discrepancy could be that we only provided a small
set of techniques as answer options to check the crite-
rion Familiarity with Methods, particularly, ETA was not
included. Assuming that many respondents are reluctant
to add further techniques in the “Other” field, this might
have led to a bias towards the specified answer options.
Assuming that Leveson’s observation is drawn from US
system safety cultures, this discrepancy could also have
arisen from the circumstance that our sample is biased
towards European safety cultures (cf. Geographical Re-
gions in Section 4.2). While this issue limits the external
validity of our exploratory study, we believe that the
results for the questions qAdeqOfMthStd, qAppOfMeth,
and qPosImpOfFMs and the hypotheses hInsufStds,
hInsufMeth, hFMsImprSaf, hAdapt:AutoGTAero,
hInsufMeth:EngDifSci, and hInsufMeth:AutoGTAero
(relying on the constructs Familiarity with Methods,
Means, and Adequacy) are not harmed by this issue.
The independence of most of the questions allows a per-
question analysis. Particularly, the 59 partial responses
might not affect any complete data points and thus were
taken into consideration for the questions for which they
delivered responses (cf. variation of N values). The rela-
tively high number of registered views (565) might stem
from users checking the questionnaire start page and con-
cluding that they do not belong to the target group (Sec-
tion 3.5): Diverse preconceptions of safety, diverse chan-
nel members, as well as short non-informative survey ad-
vertisements might have played a role. We believe, this
issue has not led to a significant loss of relevant respon-
dents or a participation of illegible respondents.
However, given that we expect the population of SPs
to be 2 to 3 orders of magnitude larger than our sam-
ple (N = 91, N ′ = 124), confident general conclusions
cannot be drawn. For this, other sampling approaches
such as the one employed by Manotas et al. [55] might
be more appropriate, given proper multilateral backing
and preparation. Their possibility to sample the popula-
tion with the support of global software companies might
be more effective than our approach based on volunteer
and cluster-based sampling from several on-line discus-
sion channels.
5.4.3. Reliability
To which extent would a repetition of the procedure in
Section 3 with the same sample lead to the same results?
It is difficult to exactly repeat this survey in the short
term because our advertisements covered many of the rel-
evant on-line channels and we expect some of the respon-
dents not willing to participate again within short-term or
at all. This is a general problem for studies of this kind.
Therefore, we suggest to 1. provide incentives, 2. pursue
off-line channels as well, 3. repeat the study in the long
term, and 4. extend the sampling period. For example,
Mendez-Fernandez et al. [60] provide a longitudinal de-
sign supporting repeatability and hence the determination
of reliability of the results.
5.5. Lessons Learned
Regarding the sample size (Section 4.2), we wished to
get more responses against the background of the effort
we had in reaching out to the population (Section 4.1).
From the Unipark questionnaire view statistics, we saw
that in some of the larger discussion forums, users seemed
to appear noticeably reluctant to respond to our question-
naire. The return rates estimated in Section 4.1 can be
considered low. In few discussion forums, our friendly, sin-
gular, and topic-related post of the questionnaire was even
penalised by deleting the post or by loosing forum mem-
bership. Unfortunately, important non-commercial panels
such as, for example, SoSciSurvey11 or SurveyCircle (Ta-
ble 6) do not offer profiling facilities to focus on engineer-
ing professionals. In the case of no budget for incentives
and for paying commercial panels, these circumstances
make it very difficult for empirical (software) researchers
to approximate a representative sample.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
We designed and conducted a questionnaire-based
cross-sectional on-line survey of safety practitioners. Our
objective was to investigate safety practice by asking prac-
titioners about means they rely on, process factors influ-
encing their work, and their role in the life cycle, and by
checking several observations stemming from previous re-
search.
6.1. Summary of Findings and Implications
Below, observations marked with + represent our aspi-
rations when performing the study. Observations marked
with − represent our apprehensions. Items labelled with
• accommodate neutral observations.
We collected evidence in support of several hypotheses
leading to the following observations:
• Our respondents confirm that safety decision mak-
ing is mostly based on expert opinion and experience
from previous projects.
• Safety practitioners think that for highly intercon-
nected systems (e.g. systems of systems, connected
transport systems), assurance of safety will have to
rely on high assurance of IT security. Our experience
suggests that the inverse relation is similarly strong.
+ They see a clear benefit in the interaction of safety
and security activities. We like to support the agenda
in [12] and motivate research of strongly integrated
safety-security approaches.
11See https://www.soscisurvey.de.
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+ The survey participants believe that formal methods
may have a positive impact on safety activities.
– Currently applied standards and practised methods
are believed to be largely inadequate to cope with the
assurance of technologies (e.g. adaptive control, ma-
chine learning) used for high automation and auton-
omy in upcoming system applications.
The last findings raise the question whether systems are
safe enough and why this would be the case [10]?
Our analysis leads to further observations:
• Resources occasionally but not typically govern safety
practitioners’ decisions and performance. The re-
sponses indicate that safety seems only rarely com-
promised by cost-benefit questions.
• Practitioners refrain from seeing safety as a special
case of reliability. This stands in contrast with Leve-
son’s former observation that safety is pervasively
confused with reliability [49].
– Safety practitioners think that many of their non-
safety co-workers’ share at most medium appreciation
of safety practitioners’ contributions to the life cycle.
– Respondents are indecisive on whether the conven-
tional or ready-to-use methods they (could) apply
scale sufficiently.
The last finding again motivates further analysis along the
lines of [10]. If we are left unsure about whether means
have become inadequate and, as found for safety RE in
[12], if conventional approaches are dominant and we
lack evidence for efficacy of novel research, how could
safety research help safety practitioners?
In summary, we share the impression that empirical re-
search in system safety is still in an early stage, on the
one hand, offering many opportunities to perform cross-
disciplinary studies and, on the other hand, bearing large
risks of not exactly knowing to which extent safety prac-
titioners are applying state of the art and able to do their
best. This is a severe issue to be discussed in software and
system safety research.
6.2. Future Work
We seek to extend our analysis by revisiting findings
from the collected data set and not discussed in this work.
Furthermore, we are going to identify and evaluate further
hypotheses and ask more why- and how-questions.
Aspiring to the exploratory approach and grounded the-
ory [53, p. 298], we can further engage with our survey
participants using the focus group method [61], request for
comments on our findings, and ask them for approaches to
overcome the identified issues. Additionally, we re-shape
our construct and focus on a smaller set of questions, for
example, to investigate the applicability of formal meth-
ods.12
Our research design can be extended towards the appli-
cation of the goal question metric approach [62]: The re-
sults of the hypotheses analysis promotes the definition of
goals of safety activities, the survey questions correspond-
ing to the hypotheses can be refined, and process and
product metrics be derived from the refined questions, for
example, as already suggested and discussed in [63, 64].
Our study object includes SPs and, consequently, some of
these metrics get measurable by questionnaires.
Our setting as well as our findings coin a good starting
point for the design of a longitudinal study, offering possi-
bilities to identify and validate causal relationships among
the measured sub-constructs (Table 2).
Inspired by previous work [65] and by [24], it would be
interesting to adapt our research design to support inves-
tigations of phenomena such as confirmation bias in prac-
tical safety arguments [39, 66].
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A. Summary of All Responses
For validation purposes, the following tables present
data summaries for all closed (q)uestions according to Ta-
ble 4 and questions for classification according to Table 1.
The “Option” column refers to the parts (if any) of multi-
part questions. The “NA’s” column signifies the number
of invalid data points for each (part of a) question. The
checksum (including invalid responses) of each row re-
sults in N = 152 responses. Rows with NA’s = 0 result
from parts (i.e., answer categories) added after content
analysis of half-open questions (Section 3.6.1). The ques-
tions qEffRoleOnJob and qEffNotionOnJob are open and,
hence, not accompanied by a corresponding table.
qValueOfKnow Value
Option
/ N
Very
low
Low Medium High Very
high
NA’s
a / 96 1 4 14 40 37 56
b / 96 1 3 25 36 31 56
c / 95 2 10 33 37 13 57
d / 95 1 1 13 53 27 57
e / 96 9 34 37 10 6 56
f / 96 1 8 47 32 8 56
g / 97 1 0 7 39 50 55
Legend: a. Hazard list from previous projects, b. Case (accident, inci-
dent) reports, c. Inspection checklist, d. Expert opinions, e. Management
recommendations, f. Co-workers’ recommendations, g. Safety-related
project experience
qImpOfConstr Impact
Option
/ N
Do not
know
No im-
pact
Low
impact
Medium
impact
High
impact
NA’s
a / 98 5 5 12 39 37 54
b / 96 2 4 6 31 53 56
c / 95 6 2 5 36 46 57
d / 95 5 4 12 31 43 57
e / 97 4 3 9 25 56 55
f / 97 1 4 23 35 34 55
g / 98 2 2 11 27 56 54
Legend: a. Budget cuts, b. Late or unclear choice of safety concepts,
c. Postponed safety decisions, d. Schedule pressure, e. Erroneous hazard
analyses, f. Vague safety standards, g. Inexperienced safety engineers
qImpOfEco Frequency
Option /
N
Often Rarely
/ Occa-
sionally
Never Do not
know
NA’s
– / 99 36 48 9 6 53
26
qAdeqOfMthStd Adequacy
Option
/ N
Do not
know
Not
ade-
quate
Slightly
ade-
quate
Adequate Very
ade-
quate
NA’s
a / 100 32 31 26 11 0 52
b / 101 22 30 33 13 3 51
c / 101 26 31 27 16 1 51
d / 101 22 48 23 8 0 51
e / 100 36 7 25 27 5 52
f / 101 29 10 26 30 6 51
g / 99 32 28 21 17 1 53
Legend: a. Self-adaptive systems, b. Highly automated and autonomous
driving, c. Distributed networked systems, d. AI/ML-based applications,
e. Medical and healthcare applications, f. Highly automated air traffic
control, g. Consumer or commercial drones
qAppOfMeth Agreement
Option
/ N
Do
not
know
Strongly
dis-
agree
Disagree Neither
agree
nor
dis-
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
NA’s
–
/ 102
5 3 28 18 37 11 50
qPosImpOfFMs Impact
Option
/ N
Do not
know
No im-
pact
Low
impact
Medium
impact
High
impact
NA’s
– / 62 4 3 15 23 17 90
qImprOfSkills Agreement
Option
/ N
Do
not
know
Strongly
dis-
agree
Disagree Neither
agree
nor
dis-
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
NA’s
a / 96 1 1 3 5 37 49 56
b / 95 9 1 14 17 36 18 57
c / 96 6 1 4 13 53 19 56
d / 95 12 6 18 21 32 6 57
Legend: a. Adapt skills to new technologies, b. Study state-of-the-art
safety principles, c. Juniors learn from seniors, d. Juniors learn from ac-
cident reports
qIntOfSafSec Agreement
Option
/ N
Do
not
know
Strongly
dis-
agree
Disagree Neither
agree
nor
dis-
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
NA’s
a / 94 3 5 13 14 35 24 58
b / 95 3 10 30 23 19 10 57
c / 93 4 4 11 15 36 23 59
d / 93 6 8 22 28 20 9 59
e / 93 5 3 10 9 42 24 59
f / 94 11 1 9 13 43 17 58
g / 92 11 0 12 16 41 12 60
h / 94 4 1 4 12 38 35 58
i / 94 5 4 3 12 49 21 58
j / 94 3 0 3 5 41 42 58
Legend: a. Security is prerequisite for safety, b. Safety is prerequisite for
security, c. SPs depend on security practitioners, d. Security practitioners
depend on SPs, e. Safety assurance requires security assurcance, f. Rare
interaction in requirements stage, g. Rare interaction in assurance stage,
h. Lack of collaboration is hazardous, i. Lack of collaboration is ineffi-
cient, j. Involvement in RE improves safety
qNotionOfSafety Multiple Choice
Option / N Checked Unchecked NA’s
a / 95 30 65 57
b / 95 27 68 57
c / 95 50 45 57
d / 95 30 65 57
e / 95 21 74 57
Legend: a. A cost factor, b. A beneficial factor, c. A necessity independent
of cost, d. A tedious mandated task, e. A secondary issue
qPrioOfSafety Agreement
Option
/ N
Do
not
know
Strongly
dis-
agree
Disagree Neither
agree
nor
dis-
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
NA’s
a / 97 1 1 1 7 44 43 55
b / 97 3 2 3 8 40 41 55
c / 97 2 2 2 16 44 31 55
d / 97 2 2 1 7 41 44 55
Legend: a. Safety is given high priority, b. Management highly values
safety, c. SPs have declared authority, d. Safety process is defined
qUndesiredEv Agreement
Option
/ N
Do
not
know
Strongly
dis-
agree
Disagree Neither
agree
nor
dis-
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
NA’s
a / 97 2 57 28 3 5 2 55
b / 96 1 11 18 12 37 17 56
c / 96 1 4 6 15 44 26 56
d / 97 2 17 18 21 29 10 55
e / 96 3 25 25 15 19 9 56
Legend: a. Lack of failures reduces need for safety, b. Accidents drive
need for safety, c. Accidents help SPs argue for safety, d. Lack of accidents
reduces need for safety, e. Safety implies reliability
qValOfContrib Value
Option
/ N
Very
low
Low Medium High Very
high
NA’s
– / 95 2 6 25 48 14 57
qCoWorkers Value
Option
/ N
Very
low
Low Medium High Very
high
NA’s
– / 95 4 19 37 28 7 57
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qImpOfExp Agreement
Option
/ N
Do
not
know
Strongly
dis-
agree
Disagree Neither
agree
nor
dis-
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
NA’s
a / 95 3 2 6 11 41 32 57
b / 95 3 1 4 13 47 27 57
c / 96 16 2 2 27 29 20 56
Legend: a. Senior SPs outperform junior SPs, b. Previous projects experi-
ence is beneficial, c. Adversarial thinking improves hazard analysis
Educational Background Multiple Choice (Classification)
Option / N Checked Unchecked NA’s
a / 124 49 75 28
b / 124 13 111 28
e / 124 23 101 28
f / 124 31 93 28
g / 124 22 102 28
h / 124 12 112 28
k / 124 6 118 28
Legend: a. Computer Science, b. Systems Engineering, e. Safety Science,
f. Electrical and Electronics Engineering, g. Mechanical and Aerospace
Engineering, h. Physics and Mathematics, k. Other Discipline
Application Domains Multiple Choice (Classification)
Option / N Checked Unchecked NA’s
a / 124 51 73 28
b / 124 54 70 28
c / 124 16 108 28
d / 124 19 105 28
e / 124 30 94 28
f / 124 17 107 28
g / 124 24 100 28
h / 124 9 115 28
j / 124 25 99 28
l / 124 15 109 28
m / 124 8 116 28
o / 152 15 137 0
p / 152 6 146 0
Legend: a. Automotive and Transport Systems, b. Aerospace Industry,
c. IT Infrastructure and Networking, d. Power and Nuclear Industry, e. In-
dustrial Processes and Plant Automation, f. Electronic Devices and Appli-
ances, g. Healthcare Systems, h. Construction and Building Automation,
j. Industrial Machinery, l. Naval Systems, m. Other Domain, o. Railway
and Cablecar Systems, p. Military and Defense Systems
Level of Experience Single Choice (Years Of Experience In Levels)
Option
/ N
< 3 3 - 7 8 - 15 16 -
25
> 25 NA’s
–
/ 119
27 27 27 18 20 33
Familiarity with Standards Multiple Choice (Classification)
Option / N Checked Unchecked NA’s
a / 124 70 54 28
b / 124 19 105 28
c / 124 47 77 28
e / 124 3 121 28
f / 124 47 77 28
h / 124 14 110 28
i / 124 8 116 28
k / 152 3 149 0
l / 152 3 149 0
m / 152 12 140 0
n / 152 4 148 0
o / 152 14 138 0
Legend: a. Generic, b. Machinery, c. Automotive and Transport, e. Agri-
culture, f. Aerospace and Avionics, h. Not Familiar, i. Other Standard,
k. Nuclear and Other Energy, l. Medical Devices, m. Railway, n. Method-
ology and Tooling, o. Military and Defense
Familiarity with Methods Multiple Choice (Classification)
Option / N Checked Unchecked NA’s
a / 124 90 34 28
b / 124 78 46 28
c / 124 16 108 28
d / 124 59 65 28
e / 123 4 119 29
f / 124 15 109 28
g / 124 15 109 28
i / 152 9 143 0
j / 152 3 149 0
k / 152 5 147 0
l / 152 3 149 0
m / 152 5 147 0
n / 152 4 148 0
o / 152 6 146 0
p / 152 3 149 0
Legend: a. Failure Mode Effects, b. Fault Trees, c. STAMP-based Meth-
ods, d. Hazard Operability, e. Security Threats, f. Not Familiar, g. Other
Concept/Method, i. Functional and Design Risk, j. Probabilistic Risk,
k. Assurance Cases, l. Root Causes, m. Event Trees, n. Automated VandV,
o. Dependencies and Interactions, p. Bidirectional Methods
Native Languages Multiple Choice (Classification)
Option / N Checked Unchecked NA’s
a / 124 54 70 28
b / 124 38 86 28
c / 124 5 119 28
d / 124 6 118 28
e / 124 2 122 28
g / 152 3 149 0
h / 152 3 149 0
i / 152 14 138 0
Legend: a. English, b. German, c. Italian, d. French, e. Chinese, g. Por-
tuguese, h. Swedish, i. Other language
Working Languages Multiple Choice (Classification)
Option / N Checked Unchecked NA’s
a / 124 113 11 28
b / 124 41 83 28
c / 124 5 119 28
d / 124 10 114 28
e / 124 12 112 28
Legend: a. English, b. German, c. Italian, d. French, e. Other language
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Table B.9: List of abbreviations used in this article
AC Acceptance Criterion
CAST Causal Analysis using System Theory
CCA Common Cause Analysis
CIA Change Impact Analysis
CMA Common Mode Analysis
DV Dependent Variable
ETA Event Tree Analysis
FFA Functional Failure Analysis
FHA Functional Hazard Analysis
FM Formal Method
FMEA Failure Mode Effects Analysis
FMECA Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis
FMEDA Failure Mode, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis
FRAM Functional Resonance Analysis Method
FTA Fault Tree Analysis
GSN Goal Structuring Notation
HRA Health Risk Assessment
IV Independent Variable
MC Multiple Choice
NA Not Available
OSHA Operation & Support Hazard Analysis
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis
PHL Preliminary Hazard List
RCA Root Cause Analysis
RE Requirements Engineering
RQ Research Question
SACM Structured Assurance Case Meta-Model
SCRA Supply Chain Risk Assessment
SE Software Engineering
SHA System Hazard Analysis
SHARD Software Hazard Analysis and Resolution in Design
SP Safety Practitioner
SPP Safety Practice and its Practitioners
STAMP System-Theoretic Accident Model & Processes
STPA System-Theoretic Process Analysis
STRIDE Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclo-
sure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege
SSHA System Safety (or Sub-System) Hazard Analysis
WBA Why-Because Analysis
ZHA Zonal Hazard Analysis
ZSA Zonal Safety Analysis
Safety-related Roles Multiple Choice (Classification)
Option / N Checked Unchecked NA’s
a / 124 62 62 28
e / 124 29 95 28
f / 124 9 115 28
g / 124 39 85 28
h / 124 23 101 28
j / 124 11 113 28
k / 124 3 121 28
m / 66 12 54 86
n / 124 4 120 28
q / 152 3 149 0
Legend: a. Safety Practitioner, e. Software Practitioner, f. Electrical or
Electronics Practitioner, g. Systems Practitioner, h. Requirements Practi-
tioner, j. Health and Safety Practitioner, k. IT Security Practitioner, m. Re-
liability Practitioner, n. Other Role, q. V and V Practitioner
Safety-related Roles Multiple Choice (Classification)
Option / N Checked Unchecked NA’s
b / 124 26 98 28
c / 124 19 105 28
d / 124 5 119 28
l / 76 13 63 76
p / 152 12 140 0
Legend: b. Researcher in Industry, c. Researcher in Academia, d. Assis-
tant, Trainee, or Junior, l. Practitioner with PhD degree, p. Consultant /
Assessor
B. List of Abbreviations
See Table B.9.
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